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and Development Studies*



*Centre for Research and Training  
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


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# **PAPI 2014**

## **The Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index**

Measuring citizens' experiences



Citation: CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP (2015). The Viet Nam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) 2014: Measuring Citizens' Experiences. A Joint Policy Research Paper by Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES), Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Ha Noi, Viet Nam.

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
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Cover design by: Phan Huong Giang, UNDP Viet Nam

Lay-out design by: Golden Sky Co.,Ltd. – [www.goldenskyvn.com](http://www.goldenskyvn.com)

Publishing licence No: ĐKHXB 784-2015/CXBIPH/16-58/LĐ and QĐXB No: 283/QĐ-NXBLĐ Issued on 08 April 2015.

ISBN: 978-604-59-3380-0




# PAPI 2014

## The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index

MEASURING CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES

Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES)  
Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)



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
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
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
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# FOREWORD

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is a policy monitoring tool that reflects citizen experiences with central to local governments in performing their governance, public administration and public service delivery functions. PAPI helps create motivation for public officials, civil servants and public employees at different levels and in different sectors to perform better in public sector management and public service delivery. The index ultimately aims at better servicing citizens and fostering national development.

This 2014 PAPI Report presents the results of the fourth annual nationwide survey, with data articulating the experiences of 13,552 citizens who have been randomly selected and who are a representative sample of different demographic groups across the country. Since the first survey in 2009, almost 61,000 citizens have engaged directly in face-to-face interviews and shared their experiences and assessments of the State's governance and public administration performance.

To improve and strengthen the quality of the research methodology and implementation, in 2014 the PAPI initiative underwent a number of additional assessments. This includes an external midterm review of the whole research package, an analysis of the sampling methodology, independent spot checks of the field surveys and independent data re-entry. The independent midterm review noted that: "PAPI, based on a thorough and sound survey methodology, has made a substantial and growing contribution to understanding good governance and public administration reform in Viet Nam."

Results from the rigorous review of PAPI's implementation approach also reconfirm that users of PAPI, including policymakers, can feel confident that the selected samples are statistically representative.

PAPI is having an increasing influence at different levels. At the national level, PAPI is now utilized as a tool for citizens to engage in providing feedback. It also provides useful data and information for different elected bodies. In 2014, PAPI reports were sent to all National Assembly members at their eighth session and the report was also presented at high-level leadership training sessions at the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics. PAPI corruption data has been used by the Government Inspectorate in its reports to the National Assembly Steering Committee, and in corruption reviews by the National Assembly Judicial Committee. PAPI is also a source of reference for a number of public sector agencies currently formulating tools to monitor user satisfaction with their services (such as certification procedures, and health and education services).

At the provincial level, an increasing number of provinces see PAPI as an essential monitoring and evaluation tool to help demonstrate their performances. To date, at least 16 provinces have issued directives, decisions or action plans in response to PAPI findings in order to leverage strengths and address weaknesses to improve performance in governance and public administration. In the meantime, about half of Viet Nam's 63 provinces have conducted workshops on PAPI in order to better understand how their citizens assess their performance. Some provinces like Thanh Hoa, Thai Nguyen and Long An have

even highlighted their PAPI scores as good indicators of their governance performance in an effort to call for investment.

Internationally, PAPI continues to be highlighted as a significant model to gather citizen voices. Many international organisations and development partners in Viet Nam have used PAPI data and information. PAPI is highlighted as an innovative participatory monitoring tool in the United Nations report “Viet Nam Country Dialogue on Post 2015 Means of Implementation.” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development and the Belgian Embassy in Viet Nam, for example, have all used PAPI data in Viet Nam policy analysis papers, as well as to generate baselines for programmatic monitoring and in formulating new support programmes. The PAPI initiative was also selected as a highlight case study by Princeton University as part of their global “Innovation for Successful Societies” initiative. Finally, in 2014 the PAPI model has been shared at different conferences and experience-sharing sessions in Australia, Bhutan, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Myanmar .

These accolades demonstrate the scientific validity of the PAPI results, which are captured thanks to the close and effective coordination with national partners, in particular the Commission for People’s Petitions under the

National Assembly Steering Committee, the Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT), the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) under the Viet Nam Union of Science and Technology Associations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). PAPI’s high quality is also a reflection of close coordination between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front Central Committee and its local-level committees.


With the continued guidance and support from the National Advisory Board, the credibility and impact of PAPI data and findings continues to rise. The Board, with representatives from state and government agencies and experts on governance and public administration, provides insights as well as scholarly perspectives on governance and public administration issues. Thus, PAPI has made empirical contributions to policy making at the central level and to policy implementation at the local level.

This 2014 PAPI Report seeks to contribute to ongoing efforts to improve governance and public administration performance at the provincial level. As a rich, objective and representative source of data PAPI has become a useful reference point and policy diagnostic tool for policymakers, government leaders, civil society organizations, the media, scholars and international development partners to better understand and respond to the needs of a middle-income Viet Nam.

**Centre for  
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**United Nations  
Development Programme  
in Viet Nam**



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This 2014 PAPI Report is the result of the continued productive partnership between CECODES, VFF-CRT and UNDP. The year 2014 marked the sixth annual round of collaboration between the implementing partners and the fourth annual nationwide iteration.

The report is authored by a team led by Mr. Jairo Acuña-Alfaro from UNDP. The team includes Dr. Đặng Ngọc Dinh and Dr. Đặng Hoàng Giang from CECODES, Associate Professor of Political Economy Dr. Edmund J. Malesky from Duke University (UNDP international consultant on governance measurement), Postdoctoral Fellow Dr. Paul Schuler from Stanford University (UNDP international consultant on research quality control) and Ms. Đỗ Thanh Huyền from UNDP.

PAPI surveys are made possible thanks to diligent guidance from the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) and proactive collaboration from provincial to grassroots levels. Special thanks also go to the 13,552 Vietnamese citizens who were randomly selected for the face-to-face interviews. They actively participated in the 2014 PAPI survey by sharing their valuable experiences of interactions with local authorities and perspectives on governance, public administration performance and public service delivery in their localities.

PAPI is guided by a National Advisory Board and sincere thanks are extended to its 23 members for willingly dedicating their time and knowledge towards different PAPI activities and processes.

Valuable substantive advice on what should be revised in the battery of questions about land transparency from Prof. Đặng Hùng Võ,

former Vice Minister, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), and Ms. Hoàng Thị Vân Anh, Director of the Department for Policy and Legislation, General Department of Land Administration (MoNRE) is much appreciated.

Gratitude is also extended to the Central Committee of VFF leaders who generously provided timely advice and political support for PAPI research. This is exemplified by VFF Committees from provincial to grassroots levels collaborating with the PAPI research management team during the data collection process, while maintaining their impartiality in the process so that PAPI data can assure its objectivity and high quality.

Valuable support from the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics (HCMA) and its President Dr. Tạ Ngọc Tấn in collaborating on different case studies using PAPI data and introducing PAPI findings to HCMA executive leadership training programmes is also acknowledged. Further gratitude is extended to Dr. Đinh Xuân Thảo, President of the Institute for Legislative Studies under the National Assembly Standing Committee, and his colleagues for assistance in disseminating PAPI findings to National Assembly delegates and Provincial People's Council members from southern provinces. Thanks also go out to VFF-CRT Vice Director Dr. Phạm Thị Hồng and her colleagues, as well as former VFF-CRT Vice Director Dr. Nguyễn Quang Du and Mr. Nguyễn Ngọc Dinh, former Director of the Department for Democracy and Law (VFF Central Committee), for the successful organization of seven regional workshops to disseminate PAPI findings to all 63 provinces in 2014.

The great contribution of a team of lead enumerators/field controllers also had a critical role to play. Mr. Phạm Hải Bình, Ms. Tạ Kim Cúc, Mr. Phùng Văn Chấn, Mr. Nguyễn Văn Công, Mr. Nguyễn Quang Du, Ms. Trần Thị Dung, Ms. Nguyễn Thị Xuân Dung, Mr. Đỗ Xuân Dương, Mr. Vũ Quang Điệp, Ms. Cù Thị Đoài, Ms. Nguyễn Vũ Giang, Mr. Đặng Hồng Hà, Ms. Lại Thị Nguyệt Hằng, Ms. Nguyễn Công Hiến, Mr. Nguyễn Văn Hiệu, Mr. Nguyễn Bá Hùng, Ms. Đặng Quế Lan, Mr. Lê Văn Lữ, Mr. Hoàng Minh, Ms. Hồ Như Nguyệt, Mr. Trần Ngọc Nhẫn, Ms. Lại Thanh Nga, Mr. Đặng Hoàng Phong, Mr. Đặng Thanh Phương, Mr. Đặng Hữu Phương, Mr. Phan Châu Thành, Ms. Nguyễn Thị Phương Thúy, Mr. Nguyễn Văn Trà, Ms. Nguyễn Quỳnh Trang, Mr. Nguyễn Ngọc Tùng and Mr. Bùi Huy Tưởng deserve special mention as they ensured the data collection process was fully compliant with strict PAPI procedures and standards.

In addition, thanks must go to the more than 500 interviewers selected by the Centre for Live and Learn for Community Development (Live & Learn) from nearly 2,000 applications from final-year university students across Viet Nam. Without these young and enthusiastic interviewers, the data collection process could not have been completed. Special thanks go to Ms. Nguyễn Thị Thu Lành and Ms. Trần Văn Anh (Live & Learn) for having collaborated effectively in the recruitment of the interviewers.

Great appreciation is extended to the Mekong Development Research Institute for their independent spot checks of the field surveys in 20 randomly selected provinces. Their work helped strengthen PAPI data collection processes. Great thanks also go to Dr. Trần Thị Bích, Vice Head of the Statistics Department, and her students at the National

Economics University for the diligent re-entry of randomly selected PAPI questionnaires for a double-check of the quality of the original 2014 data entry.

The time and efforts of Mr. Xavier Oudin and Mr. Yoann Lamballe from the University of Paris-Dauphine, Research Institute for Development, contributed to a deeper look into PAPI respondent weights for national-level statistics and was very valuable.

The work of Dr. Lê Thị Nghệ from CECODES is recognized for her pivotal role in administering the fieldwork, as are the contributions from Mr. Nguyễn Văn Phú and Mr. Nguyễn Đức Trí from CECODES for their effective coordination with provincial VFF committees during the data collection process, Dr. Phạm Minh Trí for developing an effective PAPI data entry tool and the data entry team, including Mr. Trần Công Chính, Mr. Trần Đức Ngọc, Mr. Đặng Hoàng Phong, Mr. Lê Minh Tâm, Ms. Trần Thị Thường and Mr. Phạm Minh Tuấn.

Thanks are also extended to Sunshine Open Solutions for its support in the development of the interactive [www.papi.vn](http://www.papi.vn) website. In addition, Dr. Nguyễn Việt Cường from the National Economics University generously helped by producing the coloured maps portraying provincial performance levels. Ms. Pernille Goodall, a UNDP copy editor and communications consultant, timely and diligently supported with copy-editing the English version of this Report.

Last but not least, generous funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is greatly acknowledged, together with funds from the One Plan Fund of the UN and UNDP in Viet Nam.



# PAPI NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Mr. **Bakhodir Burkhanov**, Deputy Country Director (Programme), United Nations Development Programme in Viet Nam

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Mr. **Bùi Phương Đình**, Director, Vietnam Institute for Leadership and Public Policy, Ho Chi Minh National Politics Academy

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Mr. **Phạm Duy Nghĩa**, Lecturer, Fulbright Economics Teaching Programme, University of Economics, Ho Chi Minh City

Mr. **Thang Văn Phúc**, (Advisory Board lead) former Vice Minister of Home Affairs, President of the Viet Nam Institute of Development Studies


Mr. **Trần Đức Lượng**, Deputy Inspector General, Government Inspectorate

Mr. **Trần Việt Hùng**, Vice President, Viet Nam Union of Science and Technology Associations

Mr. **Samuel Waelty**, Country Director, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

Note: The list is in alphabetical order by family name.





# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is a policy monitoring tool that reflects citizen experiences with central to local governments in performing their governance, public administration and public service delivery functions. PAPI helps create motivation for public officials, civil servants and public employees at different levels and in different sectors to perform better in public sector management and public service delivery. The index ultimately aims at better servicing citizens and fostering national development for all.

This 2014 PAPI Report presents the results of the fourth annual nationwide survey, with data articulating the experiences of 13,552 citizens who have been randomly selected and who are a representative sample of different demographic groups across the country. Since the first survey in 2009, almost 61,000 citizens have engaged directly in face-to-face interviews and shared their experiences and assessments of the State's governance and public administration performance.

PAPI fits naturally in Viet Nam's transition to a middle-income country and provides an unparalleled wealth of data for policymakers to assess levels of governance and public administration performance. Since 2011 PAPI has collected information annually and has become the largest nationwide public accountability tool in the country. In 2014, an independent midterm review found that "PAPI has made a **substantial and growing contribution** to understanding of good governance and public administration reform in Vietnam. PAPI's **citizen-centred approach**, giving citizens the chance to provide

feedback to local government and services on their own, is groundbreaking in Vietnam" (emphasis in original).

Over the years, PAPI has been used by a wide range of stakeholders both inside and outside of Viet Nam for government performance assessment and policy review. For instance, a growing number of provincial government authorities (i.e. People's Committees and People's Councils) have responded to PAPI's findings. The number of provinces that have officially posted responses to PAPI is growing, together with an emerging number of policy documents from think tanks, international development partners and universities that use PAPI data and information.

In preparation for high-level public officials to resume important leadership roles in central and local government in 2016, the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics (HCMA) has featured a dedicated session on PAPI in its senior leadership courses. In addition, the HCMA has pioneered action learning research with six provinces, four of which have worked out concrete and detailed provincial action plans to improve their performance in areas that are lagging behind.

International development partners have also made extensive use of PAPI. The World Bank, for instance, has consistently used PAPI data in their governance and fiscal analyses in Viet Nam. The European Union and the Belgian Embassy in Viet Nam, is using PAPI data to frame governance interventions. The United States Agency for International Development has included PAPI data as a benchmark of performance in their governance programmes. Finally, internationally renowned universities have

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*PAPI fits naturally in Viet Nam's transition to a middle-income country and provides an unparalleled wealth of data for policymakers to assess levels of governance and public administration performance.*

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written about PAPI and portrayed it as a good example of policy innovation and as a reference source for inspiring possible replication in other contexts.

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*What PAPI scores reflect are structural issues citizens encounter when experiencing provincial performance in governance and public administration. These scores act as mirrors of the performance and provincial authorities should focus on identifying actionable measures to fix problematic areas.*

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The impact PAPI is having is testament of how data and evidence is helping improve policies. It is also a reminder that the data and indicators portrayed by PAPI are measures and not targets. An important message for policymakers and practitioners is thus that scores should be read as an opportunity to assess performance across a wide range of structural issues, and not as a critique or call to improve a particular score. Indeed, what PAPI scores reflect are structural issues citizens encounter when experiencing provincial performance in governance and public administration. These scores act as mirrors of the performance and provincial authorities should focus on identifying actionable measures to fix problematic areas. The ultimate objective of PAPI is to provide evidence of citizen experiences so that authorities can improve the reflection seen in the mirror. Any attempt to change PAPI scores without performance improvement will not help increase or sustain citizen satisfaction with what they experience in the everyday performance of their local governments. This is akin to changing the mirror and expecting to get a better reflection.

Structurally, this report builds on the collected data and is consistent with how previous PAPI reports have been organized. The main objective of PAPI is to provide data on and evidence of citizens' experience with governance and public administration, in order to support policy making processes. As such, the report is accompanied by the website [www.papi.vn](http://www.papi.vn) with detailed documentation on provincial profiles, case studies, policy responses and up-to-date information.

## National Governance Trajectories

PAPI has now been implemented nationwide for four years in a row. Once again, the 2014 scores exhibited remarkable stability,

providing further evidence of the reliability of the measures. For five out of the six dimensions (participation at local levels, transparency, vertical accountability, control of corruption in the public sector, public administrative procedures and public service delivery) the scores shifted less than 2% points compared with 2013. Despite the stability, the aggregate data reveals several trends worthy of note.

Based on a review of the national-level indicators, there are several issues that demand attention in 2015:

1. The dimension 'participation at the local level' suffered the steepest drop, with 'opportunities for participation' the sub-dimension that was most responsible for the decline. This decline can be attributed to less citizen participation in village head elections, not only in elections of National Assembly delegates and People's Council representatives. Although the overall drop could be a result of the survey being conducted further from the time of the last election, as Viet Nam debates a new election law in preparation for the 2016 elections, policymakers should ensure that measures are taken to enhance the opportunities for citizens to have their voices heard and to participate more actively in grassroots political life.
2. Viet Nam must continue its efforts to stem corruption. Despite the attention paid to the issue by high-ranking officials, the results from the 2014 PAPI survey show that the issue is stubbornly persistent.
3. The 2014 PAPI Report demonstrated a reduction in the number of citizens impacted by land seizures. It is too early to say whether this is a result of the new Land Law or simply a desire by local officials to maintain status quo ahead of the party congress in 2016. However, even with the reduced number of citizens impacted the issue of compensation remains problematic, with most affected citizens complaining that compensation levels are unfair.

The report sums up some of the broad findings from the 2014 survey and their evolution since 2011. It focuses on the overall governance scores, zooms in on corruption, and presents the findings of a new module discussing state requisition of land. Given the amendment of the Land Law in 2013 and its entry into force in mid-2014, new questions about land transparency were added and the 2014 findings in these new indicators will serve as a timely baseline to monitor law implementation over time.

As mentioned, 2014 once again exhibited stability in the aggregate dimensions of governance and public administration. The one area that showed the most change was 'participation at the local level', within which the 'civic knowledge' and 'opportunities for participation' sub-dimensional scores showed the steepest declines. Regarding the 'control of corruption in the public sector' dimension, citizens saw little improvement and in some areas showed increased cynicism. The biggest shift was in the increased number of respondents agreeing that corruption and bribery were serious issues within various areas of public service delivery.

Finally, in terms of land use, fewer respondents reported having land seized in 2014 than any of the previous years. Also, results confirm the counterintuitive finding of previous reports that the relationship between transparency in land use and citizen satisfaction are not necessarily linear. Citizens that were informed of district land-use plans were actually less satisfied with compensation than those that were not informed.

### Strengthening PAPI Reliability

Each year, the second chapter of the PAPI report uses the survey to shine a light on a specific issue. In 2013 the chapter looked at inequality and in 2012 it focused on corruption. In this 2014 PAPI Report, the chapter takes a different approach and reviews the methodology and implementation of the survey itself from the initial sampling phase to the final analytical phases. This was chosen

for several reasons. First, SDC and UNDP just completed an external midterm review, which posed some methodological questions about the appropriateness of the sampling strategy. As questions related to sampling have been raised in other fora, this is an optimal time to tackle these concerns head-on. Second, given that the chapter would be reviewing the methodology, it was felt that it was an appropriate time to also review other aspects of the survey.

In response to the methodological questions a number of reviews of ways to strengthen PAPI reliability were initiated. The first check compared the PAPI sampling strategy to alternatives that have been proposed. This analysis confirmed that PAPI's district sampling strategy was superior to the alternative approaches in terms of reducing the bias in favour of particular districts within a province. It provided the best representation of the actual views of citizens in each individual province.

The second and third checks assessed the quality of the data collection and data entry by re-interviewing a subset of respondents and re-entering another sample of questionnaires. These checks confirmed that the initial data entry was reliable and accurate. The only potential area of concern was that the re-interviews revealed enough differences to raise concerns that some respondents may have answered on behalf of relatives. While this problem demands further attention, additional analysis revealed that there was no regional pattern to these discrepancies, which meant that these deviations did not impact the overall results.

The results of this review show that PAPI is the best and most representative survey on governance and public administration in Viet Nam available today. Hopefully, this will provide confidence to the growing number of researchers and policymakers that use PAPI to make evidence-based policy recommendations to assist Viet Nam on its development path.

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*PAPI is the best and most representative survey on governance and public administration in Viet Nam available today.*

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## Provincial Performance: Incremental Progress at Slow Pace

The 2014 PAPI Report moves away from national ranking but details provincial performance with an analysis of trends at dimensional, sub-dimensional and indicator levels over time. The report also turns towards local-level policymakers by presenting variations in provincial performance in a comparative perspective. An add-on to this is the comparison of the performance between regions and the five centrally governed municipalities. This is helpful to identify not only good and poor performers, but also good practices at provincial level that other provinces, especially those with similar socio-economic and geographic characteristics, can learn from and adapt to their localities.

One note for the 2014 PAPI Report is that the scores reflect the totals from 61 provinces. Two provinces were dropped from the analysis due to an insufficient number of reliable survey responses to calculate robust provincial estimates.

## Participation at Local Levels: A Citizen's Constitutional Right

Participation in political, social and economic life is a Vietnamese citizen's constitutional right, enshrined in the country's Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO). Understanding citizens' participation as such is necessary to examine their involvement and roles in governance. This first dimension of PAPI measures citizens' knowledge of their participation rights and how they exercise them.

Participation at the local level remains limited in the aspects PAPI measures, with three out of the four sub-dimensions that constitute the first PAPI dimension declining in scores compared to the 2011 baselines. This is critical as participation in political life is important for citizens to exercise their democratic rights and to do their part to help improve local governance. Village head elections remain

largely symbolic, with practices such as having fewer than two candidates and candidates being suggested by the authorities. The 'voluntary contribution' sub-dimension saw a more positive sign as a larger share of citizens have been involved in decision-making and designing of community projects.

Improving this dimension would not require large financial investment from provinces. It, however, needs local governments' strong commitment to engaging citizens in political life and policy making in practical terms and to complying with state regulations on organizing elections.

## Transparency: Citizens' Rights to Know

PAPI measures citizens' "rights to know" about state policies that affect their everyday life and livelihoods. 'Transparency' in the three key sub-dimensional areas 'poverty lists', 'commune budgets' and 'local land-use planning and pricing' is the focus of this second dimension of PAPI.

This dimension sees mixed signs and suggests room for improvement in all three sub-dimensions. While transparency in 'poverty lists' remains unchanged and in 'commune budgets' declined slightly, transparency in 'land-use planning and pricing' continued to improve in 2014, despite its consistent lower scores compared to the other two sub-dimensions. Indeed, the change in this sub-dimension is in part a reflection of the greater room for improvement. Transparency in commune budgets is still weak, as only eight out of 100 people know about, have read and trust the publicized notices and information about their communes' budgets and expenditures. In addition, transparency in land-use plans saw a mixed trend. While the price of compensation improved significantly and was more in line with market levels, disclosure of land-use plans and land-use purposes deteriorated. It will be interesting to see if these diverging trends in transparency of land plans continue.

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*Participation in political life is important for citizens to exercise their democratic rights and to do their part to help improve local governance.*

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To improve transparency in a sustainable way, it is important for local governments to find and adapt different means of disclosing trustworthy information to citizens with different demographic backgrounds. This can be done through government portals at provincial and district levels, notice boards at the commune level or posts and loudspeakers at the village level.

### *Vertical Accountability: Citizens' Rights to Discuss and Verify*

This dimension measures key 'vertical accountability' aspects, including 'interactions with local authorities,' along with the coverage and effectiveness of PIBs (People's Inspection Board) and CISBs (Community Investment Supervision Board). These mechanisms, in accordance with the GRDO, help to make local governments and public officials accountable to their citizens in the operationalization of governance functions.

There is insignificant improvement in provincial performance in vertical accountability towards citizens when comparing the findings over time. More improvement is seen in the coverage and effectiveness of CISBs and in the frequency and usefulness of interactions between local governments and citizens than in the coverage and effectiveness of PIBs.

Since the outset of grassroots democracy regulations in 1997, CISBs and PIBs have been supposed to act as citizen monitoring mechanisms to enhance vertical accountability towards citizens at the grassroots level. However, with such modest citizen recognition of both the existence and effectiveness of these community boards, it is time to review their performance and consider alternative ways to make them work and be felt more by citizens. A suggestion would be to involve non-governmental organisations that may have better capacity and resources in coaching and working together with the boards.

In tandem with the two monitoring mechanisms, local authorities should interact more with citizens through regular and ad-hoc direct meetings to make them more accountable to their citizens. Also, to encourage citizens to make proposals to improve local affairs, local authorities can adopt innovative ways like e-mailboxes on local government portals or messages to public mobile hotlines. More importantly, it is local officials providing timely responses to citizen concerns and requests that will make the difference.

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*Local authorities should interact more with citizens through regular and ad-hoc direct meetings to make them more accountable to their citizens.*

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### *Control of Corruption in the Public Sector: Both Sides of the Transaction Matter*

Findings from the 2014 survey on citizen experiences with local government performance in controlling corruption focus on four aspects: 'limits on public sector corruption,' 'limits on corruption in public service delivery,' 'equity in state employment,' and 'willingness to fight corruption.'

The findings show that efforts to control corruption at the provincial level have had limited effect. Citizens across the country still witness the prevalence of nepotism for state employment, bribery in the public sector and a lack of willingness to fight corruption from both sides of the coin (i.e. the local government and citizens themselves). There is a regional pattern showing that citizens in the south-central and southern provinces tend to perceive and experience that their local authorities perform better in mitigating corrupt acts in the public sector than most of the provinces in other regions.

What poorer performing provinces can learn from better performing ones include the need to ensure better equity in state employment, less bribery for public services and fewer incidences of public officials making use of their power to receive informal payments from state fund diversion, provision of public administrative services and state recruitment. Stronger willingness from citizens in reporting corrupt acts will also be needed.

### *Public Administrative Procedures: Continued Reforms Needed*

This dimension examines the quality of public administrative services in areas important to citizens and encompasses certification services and application procedures for construction permits, land use rights certificates (LURCs) and personal documents. The four indicators used to construct this dimension reveal issues that affect citizens' satisfaction with public administrative services.

Compared to 2013, this dimension stagnated in the performance of local government agencies providing professional and responsive administrative services. This dimension also shows the uneven quality of the four different citizen-centric public administrative services, with certification services, for example, performing much better than LURC services.

Of the four sub-dimensions, the public administrative service for LURCs does not seem to gain citizen satisfaction at either the national or provincial level. On a scale of 0.25 to 2.5 points, the 2014 national mean score for the sub-dimension on land procedures is the lowest of the four at the national level and is declining at the provincial level.

Challenges facing provincial governments in improving citizen satisfaction with these public administrative services include the need for more transparency in application fees, responding within the deadline, and, more significantly, the need for better behaviour and competence of civil servants providing the services. Measures to increase citizen satisfaction with public administrative services may include relevant local government agencies displaying fees and charges at one-stop shops and notifying applicants of changes in deadlines. More importantly, as PAPI findings over time have confirmed, citizens are demanding that civil

servants improve their soft skills, in particular interpersonal communication with clients and their professional competence in processing the administrative services.

### *Public Service Delivery: Enhanced Human Resources to Promote Development*

The quality of 'public service delivery' is examined in PAPI through four key public services: public health care, public primary education, basic infrastructure and residential law and order. Citizens are asked about their direct experiences with the accessibility, quality and availability of basic public services in their communes/wards, districts and provinces.


Findings from this dimension indicate slight improvements in the quality of three out of the four selected public services (public health care, basic infrastructure and residential law and order). For example, improving access to basic infrastructure (electricity, roads, clean water and garbage collection) has contributed to the overall higher dimensional score. On the other hand, public primary education services tend to see less user satisfaction at a national aggregate level. All provincial governments need to invest more in education services in terms of human resources and interactions between service users and public primary schools.

It is necessary for Viet Nam as a middle-income country to continue improving public services and basic infrastructure. Better public services, in particular health and education, will bring about better human resources that foster innovation and creativity for a more advanced economy. In the meantime, better infrastructure and law and order will help boost productivity and efficiency. These are important contributions in helping the country secure a sustainable pace of development.

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*Citizens are demanding that civil servants improve their soft skills, in particular interpersonal communication with clients and their professional competence in processing the administrative services.*

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# INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Viet Nam made its official transition to the ranks of a middle-income country and continued on its path towards meeting citizens' expectations for better governance, public administration performance and service delivery. Now, the country is a fully fledged middle-income country with an increasing middle class and far greater opportunities for the next generations. The country's human development index has increased from a low score of 0.476 in 1990 to the middle category of 0.623 in 2013<sup>1</sup>. In addition, income per capita has substantially increased from only US\$285 in 1985 to US\$1,910 in 2013<sup>2</sup>. This shift in development stages also means people's expectations of governance in general, and public administration and public service delivery in particular, are changing. The more educated, healthier and wealthier citizens become, the more demanding they are of government service provision.

In line with this transition, policy making has started to shift from data-averse to evidence-driven, as well as towards appreciation of external policy monitoring tools. The Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is one of the external time-series data sources being used to measure governance and public administration performance of governments at different levels from the perspective of citizens' experiences. In addition, there is the Provincial Competitiveness Index that measures businesses' experiences with provincial economic governance. These complement self-assessment tools like the

Public Administration Reform Index (known as the PAR-Index) created by the Ministry of Home Affairs. These tools provide a gold mine of data for policymakers and researchers to triangulate government-business-citizen assessments of policy implementation so as to inform subsequent policy reforms.

Yet, important challenges in governance and public administration remain ahead as Viet Nam aims to avoid falling into the middle-income trap. One of the challenges is to advance from a better availability of basic services to a higher quality of governance and public service provision to address the shift in citizens' expectations. These challenges can be addressed when implementation of recent and upcoming policy reforms is monitored and assessments are taken into account by central and local governments.

The 2014 PAPI research was conducted amidst monumental policy changes. The amended Constitution in 2013 provided a number of important articles regarding access to information, basic human rights, governance and institutional aspects, including organization of central and local governments. In addition, in 2015 the Government will have implemented half of the 2011-2020 PAR Master Programme, which aims to significantly improve service delivery, citizens' satisfaction with administrative procedures and human resources, and clarify the roles and responsibilities of administrative agents. The Anti-Corruption Law of 2005 will also undergo revision after

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<sup>1</sup> See UNDP's Human Development Indicators, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/VNM>

<sup>2</sup> See World Bank's World Development Indicators, available at [http://data.worldbank.org/country/vietnam#cp\\_wdi](http://data.worldbank.org/country/vietnam#cp_wdi)

*PAPI provides an unparalleled wealth of data for policymakers to assess levels of performance.*

10 years of implementation. Furthermore, the Communist Party has recently called for strengthened mandates of the VFF in gathering social feedback and facilitating citizen monitoring of public agencies' performance.

On the relevance of PAPI, an independent midterm review in 2014 noted that it is "fully consistent with the VFF's mission of promoting grassroots democracy, social monitoring and criticism (*giám sát, phản biện xã hội và dân chủ cơ sở*), the National Assembly's mandate of responsiveness to the concerns of voters, and the Communist Party's emphasis on the ownership rights of the people (*quyền làm chủ [của nhân dân]*". Furthermore, PAPI's research into key policy issues will become critically important considering that in 2016 the Communist Party will hold its five-yearly major Congress, that elections will be held for

a new National Assembly in the spring and that a new government will subsequently follow for the period from 2016-2020.

PAPI provides an unparalleled wealth of data for policymakers to assess levels of performance. Since 2011, PAPI has collected information annually and has become the largest nationwide, publicly available accountability tool in the country (see Box 1). In addition, the independent midterm review found that "PAPI has made a **substantial and growing contribution** to understanding of good governance and public administration reform in Vietnam. PAPI's **citizen-centred approach**, giving citizens the chance to provide feedback to local government and services on their own, is groundbreaking in Vietnam" (emphasis in original)<sup>3</sup>.

### Box 1: A Snapshot of PAPI

PAPI: The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index	
<b>What PAPI measures:</b>	Six dimensions, 22 sub-dimensions, 92 indicators <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Participation at Local Levels</li> <li>2. Transparency</li> <li>3. Vertical Accountability</li> <li>4. Control of Corruption</li> <li>5. Public Administrative Procedures</li> <li>6. Public Service Delivery</li> </ol>
<b>Method:</b> Face-to-face interviews	<b>Duration:</b> From 45-60 minutes on average
<b>Who:</b> 60,944 citizens since 2009 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2014: 13,552 (52.94% women)</li> <li>• 2013: 13,892 (52.68% women)</li> <li>• 2012: 13,747 (52.66% women)</li> <li>• 2011: 13,642 (52.96% women)</li> <li>• 2010: 5,568 (30 provinces; 47.56 % women)</li> <li>• 2009: 543 (3 provinces; 40.33% women)</li> </ul>	<b>Where:</b> Across all 63 provinces and municipalities in Viet Nam since 2011, covering <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 207 districts</li> <li>• 414 communes</li> <li>• 828 villages</li> </ul>
<b>Sampling:</b>	International state-of-the-art methodological standards: probability proportional to size and random selection
<b>Implementing partners:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES)</li> <li>• Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)</li> <li>• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</li> </ul>
<b>Information gateway:</b>	Website: <a href="http://www.papi.vn">www.papi.vn</a> Facebook: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/papivn">www.facebook.com/papivn</a> Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/PAPI_Vietnam">@PAPI_Vietnam</a> YouTube: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/PAPIVietNam">www.youtube.com/user/PAPIVietNam</a>

<sup>3</sup> Andrew Wells-Dang and Pham Quang Nam (2014), p. 5

Over the years, PAPI has been used by a wide range of stakeholders both inside as well as outside of Viet Nam<sup>4</sup>. Annex B for instance provides a sample of how specific provincial government authorities (i.e. People's Committees and People's Councils) have responded to PAPI's findings. The number of provinces that have officially posted responses to PAPI is growing, together with an emerging number of policy documents emanating from think tanks, international development partners and universities using PAPI information.

In preparation for high-level public officials to resume important leadership roles in the central and local governments in 2016, the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics (HCMA) has featured a dedicated session on PAPI in its senior leadership courses. These high-level training courses are a great opportunity to discuss citizens' experiences with governance and public administration with high-level Communist Party members and explore ways of triangulating the data with other internal government mechanisms and self-assessments. In addition, the HCMA has pioneered action learning research with six provinces, four of which have worked out concrete and detailed provincial action plans to improve their performance in areas that are lagging behind.

International development partners have also made extensive use of PAPI. The World Bank, for instance, has consistently used PAPI data in their governance and fiscal analyses in Viet Nam. The European Union and the Belgian Embassy in Viet Nam are using PAPI data to frame their governance interventions. The United States Agency for International Development has included PAPI data as a benchmark of performance in their governance programmes in the country. Finally, internationally renowned universities like Princeton<sup>5</sup> have written about PAPI,

portraying it as a good example of policy innovation and reference source for inspiring possible replication in other contexts.

These are concrete examples of the impact PAPI is having and testaments of how the data and evidence provided is helping improve policies. They are also a reminder that the data and indicators portrayed by PAPI are measures and not targets. That is, the information provided by PAPI reflects overall performance issues. Attempting to target increasing PAPI scores is neither the objective nor the purpose of this policy monitoring tool.

This report builds on the nationwide survey data and is structured in a similar way as previous PAPI reports, enabling easy tracking of changes in findings over time at the national and provincial levels. The first chapter tracks changes in the overall national performance of governance and public administration from 2011-2014. The second chapter provides an account of stages in strengthening PAPI reliability, covering sampling methods, data collection and data entry. This chapter reveals the robustness of PAPI and responds to recent calls to further explain and document the methodology. Chapter 3 presents aggregated and disaggregated findings for provinces, with time series comparisons at dimensional, sub-dimensional and indicator levels. What is new in this chapter, compared to previous years, is that provinces are grouped by eight socio-economic regions to enable provinces with similar socio-economic and geographical characteristics to learn from each other. Five centrally-governed municipalities are also compared to promote sharing of good practices among them.

The report is accompanied by the website [www.papi.vn](http://www.papi.vn), which includes detailed documentation on provincial profiles, case studies, policy responses and up-to-date information.

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*International development partners have made extensive use of PAPI.*

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<sup>4</sup> An indication of PAPI's reach is the number of downloads from the UN website in Viet Nam (see [www.un.org.vn/en/publications](http://www.un.org.vn/en/publications)), where PAPI reports have been downloaded more than 21,000 times over the years (with 9,936 times for the 2010 report, 6,554 times for the 2011 report, 3,479 times for the 2012 report and 1,643 times for the 2013 report).

<sup>5</sup> See Princeton University (2014)



# CHAPTER 01

## NATIONAL TRENDS FROM 2011-2014

### Overview

This chapter sums up the broad findings from the 2014 survey. It focuses on the overall governance scores, zooms in on corruption, and presents the findings of a new module discussing state requisition of land. Given the amendment of the Land Law in 2013 and the law's entry into force in mid-2014, new questions about land transparency were added and the 2014 findings in these new indicators will serve as a timely baseline to monitor implementation of the law over time.

To preview, the 2014 survey once again exhibited stability in the aggregated dimensions of governance. The one area that showed the most change was 'participation at the local level', within which the 'civic knowledge' and 'opportunities for participation' sub-dimensional scores showed the steepest declines. The declines may be due to the amount of time that has elapsed since the last round of elections in 2011. Regarding 'control of corruption in the public sector' dimension, citizens saw little improvement in provincial level control of corruption and in some areas showed increased cynicism. The biggest shift was in the increased number of respondents agreeing that corruption and bribery were of concern within various areas of public service delivery at the provincial level.

Finally, in terms of land use, fewer respondents reported having land seized in 2014 than any of the previous years. There are several possible explanations for this. One could be that the 2013 Land Law and associated decisions have strengthened the rights of citizens and raised the costs of acquiring land for the State. Although the law did not go into effect until 1 July 2014, officials may have adapted their strategies in anticipation of the new law. At the same time, despite the new law, among those that did report losing land the majority was dissatisfied with the level of compensation received. Furthermore, results also confirm the counterintuitive finding of previous reports that the relationship between transparency in land use and satisfaction are not necessarily linear. Citizens that were informed of district land-use plans were actually less satisfied with compensation than those that were not informed.

### National Trends in the Indicators


PAPI has now been implemented nationwide for four years in a row. Once again, the 2014 scores exhibited remarkable stability, providing further evidence of the reliability of the measures (see Figure 1.1). For five out of the six dimensions, the scores shifted less than 2% points compared with 2013 (see Figure 1.2). Despite the stability, the aggregate data reveals several trends worthy of note.

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
*Citizens saw little improvement in provincial level control of corruption and in some areas showed increased cynicism.*

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**Figure 1.1: PAPI Mean Scores by Dimensions from 2011 to 2014**



**Figure 1.2: Change in Mean Scores by Dimension Over Time**




Note: For data in the 2014 PAPI and later iterations, national weights rather than provincial weights are used in generating national level statistics

Most notable was the continued drop in the overall score for participation at local levels. For the third year in a row, the overall score for Dimension 1 dropped, indicating that citizens were less involved in grassroots decision-making. While the drop may have indicated real changes in participation, it is also highly possible that the decline results from the electoral cycle. As the last round of National Assembly and People’s Councils elections were more than three years ago, in 2011, citizens might have forgotten

whether or not they participated and the nature of their participation. The findings also show that fewer citizens responded that they participated in village head elections, compared to 2013. As Figure 1.3 shows, the steepest drop in the participation scores was for the sub-dimension concerning whether or not citizens voted in the last round of elections. PAPI will wait until the next round of elections to assess whether these changes represent real shifts or are a result of electoral timing and faulty memories.


*Most notable was the continued drop in the overall score for participation at local levels.*

**Figure 1.3: Change in Participation at Local Levels Scores from 2011-2014**



Regarding the other dimensions, there was little change. One potential area of concern was the end of the incremental improvement in the control of corruption. This dimension, which improved in 2012 and 2013, declined slightly in 2014. Further analysis of the dimension reveals that the advances made in terms of tackling corruption in public

service delivery stalled in 2014. As Figure 1.4 shows, the overall score for limits on public service corruption declined about 3%, after increasing almost 9% between 2012 and 2013. At the same time, these changes should not be overemphasized as this dimension exhibited stability overall.


**Figure 1.4: Change in Control of Corruption Scores from 2011-2014**

In terms of transparency the overall score dropped less than one percent, while the score for vertical accountability was nearly identical to 2013. The provision of public administrative procedures also exhibited little change. The lone bright spot was in the dimension of public service delivery. On that dimension, the national scores increased about one percent (see Figure 1.2).

Another way to consider national trends is to monitor how individual provinces are moving. Scores are calculated at the provincial level

and then measured against the change in scores for the provinces with the maximum, minimum and median scores. Figure 1.5 illustrates the changes. The scores were stable and the results are largely consistent with the findings from the previous set of figures. Nevertheless, there was a consistent drop in scores for participation at local levels for the provinces with the maximum, minimum and median scores. It is also interesting to note that it is only in the area of public service delivery where the score of the highest scoring province slightly improved.

**Figure 1.5: Changes in Dimension Scores**  
(Maximum, median and minimum provincial scores)



**Overall Development Context**

Consistent with previous years, most Vietnamese citizens were satisfied with their current economic situation. Furthermore, most citizens saw an improvement from the previous five years and are optimistic about continued improvements over the next five years. Figures 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 show the national-level aggregates for the total level of satisfaction. They show that more than


70% felt their current economic situation was “normal”, more than 60% felt that it had improved in the past five years, and more than 65% felt they will be better off in five years.

These figures can also be broken down into different demographic groups, revealing patterns consistent with previous years. Most noticeably, ethnic minorities continued to rate their past, current and future economic situation more poorly than members of the Kinh majority.


*Consistent with previous years, most Vietnamese citizens were satisfied with their current economic situation.*

**Figures 1.6-1.8: Citizen Satisfaction with Household Economic Situation**


**1.6: Current Economic Situation**



**1.7: Change in Economic Situation**



**1.8: Economic Situation in Future**




*The number of respondents worried about corruption increased slightly, with 27% concerned about the issue in 2014 compared with 25% in 2013.*

Finally, the survey also asked respondents what the top three most important socio-economic issues facing the country were. Figure 1.9 shows which issue respondents thought was one of the top three facing the country. Drug abuse and traffic accidents continued to top the list, with more than 40% of respondents including those issues as one of the top three. Issues of food hygiene

and safety continue to occupy third position in citizens' minds. Those worried about corruption increased slightly, with 27% concerned about the issue in 2014 compared with 25% in 2013.

Figure 1.9: Most Serious Socio-economic Issues in 2014



## Corruption Practices in the Public Sector

One of the most important elements of the PAPI survey is the battery of questions aimed at measuring the prevalence and intensity of corruption practices in Viet Nam. The issue continued to be an important one, with officials citing corruption as one of the most serious maladies plaguing the political system. In a meeting with voters in 2013, Viet Nam Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong referred to corruption as “an uncomfortable, itchy scab” that would not go away<sup>6</sup>. Data from the survey shows that from the perspective of citizens, while the situation did not worsen dramatically last


year, neither did it improve. Furthermore, the overall number of citizens participating in bribery or corruption did not decrease.

In terms of perceptions of corruption in the public sector, these showed a slight increase. Figure 1.10 shows, for instance, that for a wide range of categories an increasing number of citizens agreed or somewhat agreed that corruption and bribery were serious problems. The problem was most pronounced within state employment, with nearly half of respondents at least partially agreeing that bribes are necessary in order to gain a job in the public sector.

*For a wide range of categories an increasing number of citizens agreed or somewhat agreed that corruption and bribery were serious problems.*

<sup>6</sup> See VietNamNet (27 September 2013)

**Figure 1.10: Perceptions of Corruption and Bribery in the Public Sector (2011-2014)**



*An estimated 24% of citizens that obtained a land use right certificate paid an informal charge for the service.*

The survey continued to deploy a series of special questions designed to encourage citizens to candidly express their personal experience with corruption. In particular, it used a sophisticated but easy-to-answer set of questions to ask about experiences with bribery in obtaining land use rights certificates (LURCs) and services at hospitals and primary schools. In order to do this, the survey asked one group of respondents if they participated in three non-sensitive activities. For the other half, it asked the respondents if they participated in those three normal activities in addition to paying a bribe. The difference in the average number of activities between the two groups provides an estimate of the percentage of citizens being forced to engage in bribery in those areas.

In obtaining LURCs and services at hospitals and primary schools, the number of citizens engaging in bribery has not changed substantially from 2012, when responses to these questions were first presented. As Table 1.1 shows, in 2014 an estimated 24% of citizens that obtained a LURC paid an informal charge for the service. In terms of obtaining hospital services, an estimated 12% paid a bribe. To obtain better quality primary education for their children, 30% of respondents with kids at primary school had to provide informal payments. All of these numbers represent increases from the 2012 figures, which were 17% for LURCs, 10% for hospital services and 12% for primary education services.

**Table 1.1: Estimating Frequency of Bribes**


Analysis Technique	Year	Land Use Rights Certificates	Public District Health Care	Public Primary Education	Survey Question
Frequency estimated from size <sup>1</sup>	2014	24%	12%	30.2%	D507fa,
	2013	32.7%	20.3%	29.0%	D604e1,
	2012	17%	10%	12%	D606cd

(1) Reports the share of respondents in the treatment group who answered that they paid more for items than those in the control group.

Finally, in terms of whether citizens thought their local governments were serious about curtailing corruption, Figure 1.11 shows that about 39% of citizens perceived that their local governments were serious about anti-

corruption, and this is virtually unchanged from 2013. As in previous years, those who were aware of the Anti-Corruption Law were more likely to see their local governments as serious than those unfamiliar with it.

**Figure 1.11: Provincial Government Serious about Anti-corruption**



In sum, regarding control of corruption, despite national-level efforts citizens continue to perceive corruption to be an endemic problem, both within the Government and also in their direct dealings with the State.

### Land Transparency and Compensation


Given that the Land Law passed in 2013 and came into force in 2014, and because the issue of land is one of the most sensitive and important ones in Viet Nam, the 2014 PAPI survey augmented existing questions about land acquisition by the State with a new module querying the fairness of the compensation. This section traces some of the trends within this area and looks at patterns of compensation. Before proceeding, a word of caution is in order regarding these findings. Because of the clustered sampling design, readers should be careful to note the

possibility that patterns in land requisition could be a function of the particular districts and communes that were selected. This is more of a problem for an issue like land, which can impact certain communities and not others that are very close by, than for more general issues such as corruption, participation and vertical accountability. Those issues are not as likely to differ dramatically between specific villages and communes. With this in mind, long-term trends over time in the regional patterns should be given greater weight than specific years.

In terms of temporal trends, the 2014 results are striking in that far fewer respondents reported having land taken than in previous years. As Figure 1.12 shows, about 5% of respondents reported their own family or a neighbour having land taken in 2014. This is a steep drop from the relatively stable 9-10% of respondents reporting themselves or neighbours losing land in previous years.

*Far fewer respondents reported having land taken in 2014 than in previous years.*


**Figure 1.12: Trend in Land Loss as Experienced by Citizens (2011-2014)**



Looking at the regional breakdown also reveals interesting patterns. Figure 1.13 shows that those losing land continue to be concentrated in the Northwest region. Citizens in the southern regions, including the Mekong River Delta, the Southeast and South Central, reported low levels of land seizures. Consistent with the national trend, every region reported fewer land requisitions in 2014 than in 2013. Interestingly, the Red River Delta, which had reported high levels of land requisition in recent years, dropped dramatically in 2014.

In line with the note of caution above, it may be prudent to wait until the next round of surveys to see whether or not this represents a trend. However, it is possible that the new Land Law, which recent reports suggest stiffened the requirements local officials must meet in order to acquire land, may be having an effect<sup>7</sup>. An alternative, and to some extent speculative, explanation is that local officials, eager to reduce discontent in anticipation of leadership changes at next year’s Party Congress, have temporarily lost their appetite for potentially angering citizens by acquiring land for state projects.

**Figure 1.13: Land Loss as Experienced by Citizens (by Regions, 2011-2014)**



In terms of compensation, the majority of respondents reported receiving some type of compensation. As Figure 1.14 shows, the majority of those reporting that they or relatives had land seized said they received monetary compensation. However, more

than 20% of those still reported that they received no compensation at all. Given that the law requires some form of compensation for those who lose land, this startling finding requires further research.


*The majority of those reporting that they or relatives had land seized said they received monetary compensation.*

<sup>7</sup> For an evaluation of the 2013 Land Law, see World Bank (2014)

One potential answer is that only a small portion of the respondent's land was taken, and therefore no compensation was provided. The other possibility is that the families in question had no LURC, even though they might have been using the land for a long period of time. Therefore, the local

government was able to expropriate their land without compensation on the basis that they had no legal claim to the land in the first place. Obviously, more research is needed to assess the exact reason why such a large number of respondents reported losing land with no compensation at all provided.

**Figure 1.14: Types of Compensation Received**



*Only 36% of respondents who had their land taken in the past year said they received fair compensation.*


The new questions in the 2014 survey also asked about satisfaction with the level of financial recompense. In general, the responses indicated low levels of satisfaction. Only 36% of respondents who had their land taken in the past year said they received fair compensation. The number rose to 50% for those who knew friends or relatives that had land taken. These findings correspond to previous studies that suggest an overall dissatisfaction with compensation levels. In a survey cited in a 2011 World Bank report, more than 80% of citizens in three selected provinces felt the level of compensation was

insufficient to acquire a comparable parcel of land elsewhere<sup>8</sup>.

Because of PAPI's national scope, satisfaction levels can be compared across regions. This comparison reveals wide variation in the level of satisfaction with the compensation. As Figure 1.15 highlights, respondents in the Central Highlands and the Northwest regions were least likely to be satisfied with their compensation, compared to relatively high levels of satisfaction in the Northeast and South Central provinces.

<sup>8</sup> See World Bank (2011), p. 16

Figure 1.15: Fair Compensation by Region



Looking more closely at this question to see if information mattered to respondents' perception of the compensation quality is important. Information was the focus of a recent World Bank report, which raised the hope that improved transparency in land pricing and land-use plans will help reduce corruption surrounding compensation. As the report said: "Several assessments of corruption at the province level are negatively correlated with the level of transparency of land related documents"<sup>9</sup>. At the same time, the World Bank report also acknowledged that the link between transparency and outcomes is complex, and that there is no correlation between transparency and overall satisfaction with local government in other areas.

The 2014 PAPI Report is able to shed more light on this complex relationship by asking

whether a citizen's direct experience with accessing information impacted their assessment of the fairness of compensation. Although PAPI did not address the various components of transparency, such as market prices and the quality of websites, to the same degree as the World Bank study, it did include a question asking whether or not the citizen was aware of the district's land-use plan. As Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 shows, only about 16% of respondents were aware of the local land-use plans, a drop from 20% in 2013. This is obviously not the only relevant information that the province must provide, but it does allow a window into the potential impact of transparency on satisfaction with compensation. In short, does knowledge of the district's plan for the land improve satisfaction with the eventual compensation?

*Only about 16% of respondents were aware of the local land-use plans, a drop from 20% in 2013.*

<sup>9</sup> See World Bank (2014), p. 16

Interestingly, receiving information on land-use plans had different effects on the perception of the fairness of compensation, depending on whether the respondent had their land taken or whether it was a friend or relative that had their land taken. As Table 1.2 shows, those that were informed of land-use plans were less likely to be satisfied with their own level of compensation.

The data shows that, overall, only 36.54% of those that had their own land taken reported that the compensation was fair. However, 49.47% who knew someone that had land taken reported fair compensation.

Perhaps more interesting is the impact of transparency. While transparency and knowledge of land-use plans appeared to improve the perception of fairness when others had land taken, it actually decreased the perception of fairness for respondents that had their own land taken. Of those informed, 27% of those that had their own land taken thought the compensation was fair, compared with 50.33% for those knowing others with land taken. These dynamic relationships survive regression analysis that controls for other factors such as age, gender and career background.

**Table 1.2: Fair Compensation by Information Level**

	All respondents			Those informed of land plans			Question
	Mean	Low 95%	High 95%	Mean	Low 95%	High 95%	
My family	36.54%	31.01%	42.07%	27.04%	16.20%	37.87%	d207aa
My neighbour	49.47%	44.92%	54.02%	50.33%	46.00%	54.67%	d207ba

Note: "Informed" refers to question d204, which asked whether or not a respondent was aware of the district's land-use plans.

*There is wide variation in PAPI scores within provinces, implying significant differences in provincial equality.*


These findings suggest that transparency itself is not a simple panacea for dissatisfaction with local land policy. While it may be correlated with decreased corruption at the provincial level, at the individual level awareness of land-use plans only appeared to improve the perceptions of those that are not losing land themselves. While this does not necessarily mean that decreased transparency is the solution to improving satisfaction, it could mean that transparency is a necessary but insufficient component of an overall strategy. Perhaps being informed of the land-use plan exacerbated respondents' dissatisfaction because the information provided caused respondents to increase their estimates of their land's true value.

## Governance Equality within Provinces

Building on the 2013 PAPI Report which in Chapter 2 discussed equality of governance and public administration within provinces,<sup>10</sup> this section highlights governance equality within provinces based on the 2014 PAPI data. As visualised in Figure 1.16, there is wide variation in PAPI scores within provinces, implying significant differences in provincial equality. In some provinces there is very little difference between citizen experiences within the same locality, while in others the divergence is severe with neighbours essentially experiencing different classes of governance quality and public services. While some citizens experience an elite service of high efficiency, others rank their experience as extremely poor.

<sup>10</sup> See CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP (2014), pp. 17-27

Figure 1.16: Weighted PAPI Scores and Standard Error in 2014



Bubble Size= Standard Error; Outlier graph resized to fit in chart.

Figure 1.16 highlights four quadrants for analysis. The north-west quadrant indicates the ideal governance realm, as these localities have high overall governance quality and low differences in citizen experiences (i.e. low inequality). In 2014, Vinh Long, Long An and Binh Duong are standout exemplars, and of these Vinh Long and Long An maintained their lower inequality levels of 2013. The north-east quadrant is the second best performer with above average governance but substantial inequality. None of the provinces are in this quadrant.

The third ranked south-west quadrant contains provinces with below average governance and low inequality. Governance and public administration performance is not great, but at least citizens have very similar experiences

with it. Here a mix of provinces, including municipalities like Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City, as well as mountainous provinces like Lai Chau and Kon Tum, are found. Ha Giang scores the lowest in governance and public administration with some degree of variance in experiences.

The worst-case scenario is provinces with low governance quality and high inequality (the south-east quadrant), with Cao Bang, Ninh Thuan and Dien Bien consistently in this quadrant for four years. In addition, the South Central Coast province of Quang Ngai has exhibited an unusual high level of inequality since 2013, although the province saw some improvement in 2014. Nam Dinh and Vinh Phuc are also outliers in 2014.

## Conclusions

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*Policymakers should ensure that measures are taken to enhance the opportunities for citizens to have their voices heard and to participate more actively in grassroots political life.*

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Based on the review of the national-level indicators, this chapter shows that there are several issues that demand attention in 2015. First, the quality of participation at the local level suffered the steepest decline, with 'opportunities for participation' the sub-dimension that was most responsible for the drop. Notably, the decline can be attributed to less citizen participation in village head elections, not only in elections of National Assembly delegates and People's Council representatives. As Viet Nam debates a new election law in preparation for the 2016 elections, policymakers should ensure that measures are taken to enhance the opportunities for citizens to have their voices heard and to participate more actively in grassroots political life.

Second, Viet Nam must continue its efforts to stem corruption. Despite the attention paid to the issue by high-ranking officials, the results

from the 2014 PAPI survey show that the issue is stubbornly persistent.

Third, while the number of citizens impacted by land seizures fell in 2014, it is too soon to say whether this is a result of the new Land Law or simply a result of local officials not wanting to anger citizens ahead of the party congress in 2016. However, even with the reduced number of citizens impacted, the issue of compensation remains problematic, with most affected citizens complaining that compensation levels are unfair.

Finally, inequality in governance quality and public service provision is much greater in some parts of the country than others. Vinh Long, Long An and Binh Duong are provinces that seem to provide high quality governance and services to nearly all of their citizens, while Quang Ngai has remained an especially unequal provider for two consecutive years, despite some improvement over time.

# CHAPTER 02

## STRENGTHENING PAPI RELIABILITY

### Overview

Each year, the second chapter of the PAPI report uses the survey to shine a light on a specific issue. In 2013, the report looked at inequality and in 2012 it focused on corruption. In this report, the chapter takes a different approach and reviews the methodology and implementation of the survey itself, from the initial sampling phase to the final analytical phases. This was chosen for several reasons. First, SDC and UNDP just completed an external midterm review, which posed some methodological questions about the appropriateness of the sampling strategy. As questions related to sampling have been raised in other forums, this is an optimal time to tackle these concerns head-on. Second, given that the chapter would be reviewing the methodology, it was decided that it was also appropriate to review other aspects of the survey implementation.

The chapter highlights the results from a series of steps to check the implementation of PAPI through each phase of the survey

process. The first check compared the PAPI sampling strategy to alternatives that have been proposed. The second and third checks assessed the quality of the data collection and data entry by re-interviewing a subset of respondents and re-entering another random sample of questionnaires. It is hoped that this chapter will allay any concerns about the methodology used to compile PAPI. It should also provide assurance that PAPI remains the best representation of the attitudes of Vietnamese citizens towards governance and public administration performance publicly available.

### Selecting Samples: An Analysis of Alternative Sampling Strategies<sup>11</sup>

This section responds to questions about potential bias in the sampling strategy. In several meetings with policymakers, as well as in the midterm review, questions have been raised as to whether or not the probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling strategy is the best strategy to reduce bias and ensure representativeness. PPS is conducted by randomly sampling

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*PAPI remains the best representation of the attitudes of Vietnamese citizens towards governance and public administration performance publicly available.*

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<sup>11</sup> This section summarizes the findings from Acuña Alfaro, Jairo and Edmund Malesky (2014)

districts, communes and villages with a probability proportional to their population size. The logic is that geographic units with larger populations should have a higher probability of selection because they represent a larger number of citizens.

Some critics have expressed a concern that this strategy unfairly benefits some provinces and hurts others, but have never proven this empirically. Furthermore, because PAPI uses a panel where the units remain unchanged each year, these potential biases would persist each year. In meetings and in the reviews, three concrete alternatives have been proposed:

- Pure Random Sampling: Instead of sampling the districts proportional to size, simply select the districts randomly;
- Richest and Poorest: Sample the richest and poorest districts in the province;
- Largest Populations: Sample the districts with the largest populations in the province.

In this section, the PPS strategy used by PAPI is compared against these other approaches to test whether or not PAPI's strategy provides the most representative sample of provinces. To test the different strategies, ideally the PAPI score resulting from the different methods would have been compared with the provincial total. The sampling strategy that most consistently gave results that were closest to the true provincial score (the score if everyone in a province had been surveyed) would be the best. Unfortunately, PAPI scores are only calculated for districts that were randomly selected, which rendered this strategy impossible. Instead, the next best strategy, which was to compare other statistics available at the district and provincial levels, was used. These include the districts' wealth,<sup>12</sup> share of population in poverty, Gini coefficient<sup>13</sup> and population size. Table 2.1 below provides descriptive statistics for all districts nationwide.

**Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Dependent Variables Used in Analysis**

Variable	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Household Expenditure per Capita (1,000s VND)	685	14,242.93	6,524.28	4,147.45	56,190.9
Household Expenditure per Capita (ln)	685	9.48	0.4	8.33	10.94
Poverty Rate	685	27.17	22.31	0.01	92.82
Gini Coefficient	685	28	3	21	42
Population	626	61,498.62	217,071.9	736	2,343,663
Population (ln)	626	10.1	1.15	6.6	14.67

*Sources:* Lanjouw, Peter; Marra, Marleen and Nguyen, Cuong (2013). "Vietnam's evolving poverty map: patterns and implications for policy" Policy Research Working Paper Series 6355. The World Bank; General Statistics Office (2010). The 2009 Vietnam Population and Housing Census: Completed Results. Statistical Publishing House. Hanoi.

<sup>12</sup> Measure by household expenditures per capita according to the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS)

<sup>13</sup> Gini is a measure of inequality ranging from 0 (highly equal distribution of wealth) to 100 (highly unequal).

To compile the samples using the different strategies, the original sampling frame (the list of districts from the 2009 Census) was used, and districts were re-sampled based on the three alternative approaches. Consistent with the PAPI design, for each method the capital districts were selected purposefully. Also, in the six provinces where extra districts were chosen, the alternative approaches were also supplemented with extra districts.

To compare the representativeness of the different samples, a simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression at the district level was used, where the dependent variables were the four different outcome variables<sup>14</sup>. The key variable, selection, is a dichotomous variable taking on a value of 0 or 1 if a province was selected using one of the four sampling approaches (actual PAPI, pure random, richest and poorest, and biggest population). Because there are four different dependent variables and four different sampling methods, sixteen separate regressions were run, which are displayed in Table 2.2 below. The reported coefficient in Table 2.2 is the measure of the bias caused by a particular sampling method. If this coefficient is statistically significant, it means that selected districts are significantly different from their non-selected peers within provinces. The row “selected districts” contains the coefficient.

Positive numbers mean that the values for the districts selected are greater than those of the unselected districts. Stars attached to those numbers mean that the difference is statistically significant.

Panel 1 focused on the PAPI method. In that panel, no significant differences between PAPI districts and other districts within provinces were found. The differences in income, poverty rate, Gini coefficient and population size are not significantly different from zero. The same cannot be said about the other sampling methods. Under pure random sampling (method 2), selected districts would have 6% lower average household expenditure per capita and 4.6% points higher poverty rates than non-selected district. The poorest and richest strategy (method 3) would overestimate poverty by 2% points and select districts that were 24.6% smaller in size than the average district in the province.

The worst approach, however, would be to simply select the largest districts. As one might expect, this approach would overestimate income (bias = 8.9%), underestimate poverty (bias = 3.5% points) and overestimate the Gini coefficient (by .433 points). But most notably, this method would yield districts that are 100% larger than their peers.

<sup>14</sup> For more details on the methodology, see Acuña Alfaro, Jairo and Edmund Malesky (2014)

Table 2.2: OLS Analysis of Bias in Different Approaches to PAPI Sampling

(Model) Variable	1. PAPI Method			2. Pure Random			3. Poorest and Richest			4. Largest Populations						
	(1) Expendi- ture (ln)	(2) Poverty	(3) Gini	(4) Pop (ln)	(5) Expendi- ture (ln)	(6) Poverty	(7) Gini	(8) Pop (ln)	(9) Expendi- ture (ln)	(10) Poverty	(11) Gini	(12) Pop (ln)	(13) Expendi- ture (ln)	(14) Poverty	(15) Gini	(16) Pop (ln)
Selected Districts	0	0.366	0.083	0.008	-0.062***	4.622***	0.195	-0.027	0	2.129*	0.059	-0.246***	0.088***	-3.507***	0.435**	1.062***
Provincial Capitals	-0.021	-1.286	-0.212	-0.093	-0.023	-1.398	-0.233	-0.099	-0.021	-1.271	-0.21	-0.092	-0.021	-1.309	-0.217	-0.085
	0.548***	-22.886***	2.548***	-0.866***	0.597***	-26.275***	2.456***	-0.838***	0.548***	-24.187***	2.567***	-0.676***	0.846***	-20.177***	2.300***	-1.671***
	-0.033	-2.003	-0.331	-0.16	-0.034	-2.066	-0.344	-0.164	-0.033	-1.991	-0.33	-0.159	-0.032	-1.982	-0.328	-0.143
Constant	9.426***	29.374***	27.274***	10.165**	9.438***	28.587***	27.257***	10.172***	9.426***	28.931***	27.280***	10.224***	9.402***	30.415***	27.176***	9.945***
	-0.01	-0.619	-0.102	-0.043	-0.01	-0.595	-0.099	-0.042	-0.01	-0.623	-0.103	-0.043	-0.01	-0.643	-0.106	-0.038
Provincial FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	674	674	674	626	674	674	674	626	674	674	674	626	674	674	674	626
R-Squared	0.733	0.683	0.621	0.437	0.736	0.688	0.621	0.437	0.733	0.684	0.621	0.444	0.74	0.686	0.623	0.559
rmse	0.218	13.28	2.193	0.909	0.217	13.16	2.192	0.909	0.218	13.25	2.193	0.904	0.215	13.2	2.186	0.805

Standard errors, clustered at provincial level in parentheses (\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1)

The bottom line is quite clear. The PAPI approach of using PPS outperforms the alternative methods with regard to minimizing bias. Of course, just because this approach is the best this does not eliminate the possibility that some provinces may have obtained a lucky draw. However, additional analysis was conducted to show that even for the provinces where richer districts were selected, there was no positive bias in terms of the PAPI scores. Due to space constraints, details of that analysis cannot be presented here. However, the results clearly show that PPS is the optimal sampling approach given the resource constraints, and that the given selection does not benefit any particular province.

### Recording Responses: Independent Spot Checks of Field Surveys and Re-Interview of Initial Respondents

Another potential concern with any survey is inconsistency in the interview process. This section assesses the possibility that responses were incorrectly recorded during the initial

interview by re-interviewing a random set of respondents to cross-check their answers with the ones recorded by the initial interviewer. To assess the accuracy of the responses, UNDP contracted the Mekong Development Research Institute to conduct independent spot checks of the field surveys and re-interview a sample of respondents. The sample included 164 respondents from 20 provinces, 93 of whom were re-interviewed face-to-face and 71 of whom were interviewed by phone. While the results are overall consistent with the original answers, they nonetheless provide valuable information on how to improve data collection in subsequent iterations. The first step was to look at objective questions such as age. Table 2.3 shows the difference between the original data and data from the re-interviews. A negative score means that the age in the re-interviewed data was less than in the original data, while a positive score means that the age was greater in the data from the re-interviews. If the match between the original survey data and the re-interviewed data was perfect, it was expected that 100% of the re-interviewed subjects would display zero difference from the original.

*The results of additional analysis of alternative approaches to sampling clearly show that PPS is the optimal sampling approach given the resource constraints, and that the given selection does not benefit any particular province.*

**Table 2.3: Difference in Responses in Re-Interview**

All re-interviews			Face-to-face interview		
Difference	No.	%	Difference	No.	%
-4	2	1.2	-4	2	2.2
-3	1	0.6	-3	1	1.1
-1	17	10.4	-1	8	8.6
0	124	75.6	0	68	73.1
1	12	7.3	1	6	6.5
2	2	1.2	2	2	2.2
3	1	0.6	3	1	1.1
4	2	1.2	4	2	2.2
5	1	0.6	5	1	1.1
6	1	0.6	6	1	1.1
25	1	0.6	25	1	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>

As Table 2.3 shows, 75.6% of the re-interviewed respondents gave the same answer as in the initial interview. The results were largely similar whether the second interview was conducted in person or by phone. Most of the discrepancies were one year more or less than in the initial interview, with more than 93% of the respondents being within one year of the age given during the initial interview.

There are two potential explanations for the discrepancies. Regarding the 18% that were a year more or less than the age reported in the initial interview, one plausible explanation is confusion over whether the respondent used the lunar calendar or the Western calendar to calculate age. When using the lunar calendar, ages change after the Lunar New Year versus the Western method, which calculates age from the birth date. Furthermore, in Viet Nam many families follow the tradition of counting

children as one year old when they are born, as opposed to zero in the West. These factors may have led to the smaller discrepancies. The larger discrepancies of four or more years are more worrying. A potential cause for concern could be that respondents are conducting interviews on behalf of other family members or friends in either the initial interviews or the re-interviews.

Education level was another objective question where a perfect match was expected between the response given during the original interview process and the response in the re-interview, if the enumerators accurately recorded the response from the same person. Table 2.4 shows the codes for education levels and Table 2.5 shows the differences between the re-interviews and the originally recorded education level. Again, as with age, more than 94% were within a one category difference of the originally recorded result.

**Table 2.4: Education Codes**

Education level	code
No Formal Education	1
Incomplete Primary school	2
Complete Primary school	3
Incomplete secondary school	4
Complete secondary school	5
Incomplete High School	6
Complete High School	7
Some University	8
Complete University Degree	9
Post-Graduate Degree	10
Don't Know	888

**Table 2.5: Difference in Education Level**

All re-interviews			Face-to-face interview		
Difference	No.	%	Difference	No.	%
-7	1	0.6			
-3	2	1.2	-3	2	2.2
-2	3	1.8	-2	1	1.1
-1	6	3.7	-1	5	5.4
0	145	88.4	0	80	86
1	5	3	1	4	4.3
2	1	0.6	2	1	1.1
4	1	0.6			
<b>Total</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>

Moving to more substantive questions in the index, it is very reassuring to see less discrepancy between the originally recorded responses and those from the re-interviews. As Table 2.6 shows, the differences on a variety of questions range from about 25% to less than 20% during the re-interviews. Some of this may be due

to the impact of the survey itself. That is, having taken the survey recently may cause some respondents to answer differently after becoming familiar with the question. More worryingly, in line with the figures presented above, it is also possible that some of the interviewees were answering on behalf of family members.

**Table 2.6: Differentials on Selected Questions**

<b>Question: "Was your household invited for election of village head"</b>					
<b>All re-interviews</b>			<b>Face-to-face interview</b>		
Difference*	No.	%	Difference	No.	%
-887	1	0.9	-887	1	1.6
0	104	97.2	0	62	96.9
1	1	0.9	1	1	1.6
887	1	0.9			
<b>Total</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Question: "Who attended the election of village head"</b>					
Difference	No.	%	Difference	No.	%
-885	1	1	-885	1	1.6
-1	9	8.6	-1	7	11.3
0	90	85.7	0	52	83.9
1	3	2.9	1	2	3.2
2	1	1			
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Question: "What to do to know about the land price"</b>					
Difference	No.	%	Difference	No.	%
-998	2	1.2	-998	1	1.1
-1	8	4.9	-1	4	4.3
0	129	78.7	0	73	78.5
1	25	15.2	1	15	16.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>

One potential concern with the differences is that if they are concentrated in specific regions or provinces, then it could artificially boost or penalize certain provinces. For example, if certain types of respondents that were more likely to be critical of local government, such as older respondents perhaps, were systematically allowed to move out of the sample in certain areas that could artificially boost scores. On this count, the results from across the country

suggest that there is no bias with regard to region or province.

Table 2.7 shows the patterns of discrepancies for different questions by province. It reveals no regional pattern. Furthermore, there is no correlation between a high score on one of the variables and a high score on another, meaning that the errors are distributed randomly across the selected provinces.

**Table 2.7: Discrepancies by Province**

Province	Age		Know Land-Use Plan		Education Level	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Binh Dinh	2	5	2	4.5	4	4.7
Binh Duong	2	5	1	2.3	5	5.8
Bac Kan	0	0	2	4.5	2	2.3
Binh Phuoc	0	0	1	2.3	6	7
Dong Nai	1	2.5	3	6.8	4	4.7
Dong Thap	0	0	3	6.8	3	3.5
Ha Nam	6	15	2	4.5	3	3.5
Hau Giang	1	2.5	5	11.4	4	4.7
Ho Chi Minh City	2	5	1	2.3	8	9.3
Ha Tinh	1	2.5	0	0	5	5.8
Hai Phong	4	10	2	4.5	3	3.5
Khanh Hoa	2	5	3	6.8	6	7
Nam Dinh	2	5	2	4.5	3	3.5
Nghe An	6	15	0	0	5	5.8
Quang Nam	3	7.5	4	9.1	2	2.3
Soc Trang	1	2.5	2	4.5	4	4.7
Thanh Hoa	3	7.5	3	6.8	4	4.7
Thua Thien-Hue	1	2.5	4	9.1	5	5.8
Tien Giang	1	2.5	3	6.8	6	7
Yen Bai	2	5	1	2.3	4	4.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>100</b>

*The re-interview of selected respondents suggests some cause for concern that some respondents may be answering on behalf of relatives. At the same time, the analysis also shows that the patterns of different responses appear to be distributed randomly across provinces.*

To sum up, the re-interview of selected respondents suggests some cause for concern that some respondents may be answering on behalf of relatives. At the same time, the analysis also shows that the patterns of different responses appear to be distributed randomly across provinces.

### Entering the Data: A Double-Data Entry Exercise

An additional concern with any survey is whether or not data has been recorded faithfully and accurately. One quality check is to employ the costly and time-consuming procedure of double entering the data. PAPI does not employ double-data entry on an annual basis. However, in order to provide reassurance that there are not systematic issues in the data entry process, in 2014, PAPI hired an outside team of consultants from the Faculty of Statistics of the National

Economics University to re-enter survey data from the same hard copies entered by the PAPI team. For reasons of time and efficiency, 1,399 (approximately 10%) of the 13,892 respondent questionnaires were re-entered

The PAPI survey included more than 355 closed-ended questions and procedural checks. This means that there are 355 questions where the answer is coded as a number rather than a word. Out of these questions, Table 2.8 shows the number of questions where there was more than a 2% discrepancy between the original dataset and the double-entered dataset. Only 11 survey questions had more than 2% discrepancy between the original dataset and the double-entry dataset. What is more, of these 11 only six pertained to actual substantive questions. The remaining five questions were procedural in nature.

Table 2.8: Differences by Question

Question id	Question Text	Discrepancies Between Double Entry and Original	Percentage Difference*
<b>a008a</b>	What is your occupation (the code)	280	20.01%
<b>a010b</b>	What is the primary occupation of the household head (the code)	138	9.86%
<b>Totalmin</b>	Duration of interview	99	7.08%
<b>Minend</b>	When did the interview end?	61	4.36%
<b>a009</b>	In which sector is your current primary occupation [was your last job if retired]?	55	3.93%
<b>a016a1</b>	Are you a member of the Party, a Mass Organization, a professional association, cultural or social groups (for example, dance club, opera, sports team)? IF YES: Please tell me about organizations or in which you play an active role. If NO, please simply say you do not belong to any of the organizations.	54	3.86%
<b>a016b1</b>	Are you a member of the Party, a Mass Organization, a professional association, cultural or social groups (for example, dance club, opera, sports team)? IF YES: Please tell me about organizations or in which you play an active role. If NO, please simply say you do not belong to any of the organizations.	46	3.29%
<b>khuvuc</b>	Interview location	42	3.00%
<b>minstart</b>	When did the interview start?	41	2.93%
<b>d606a1</b>	Among those [children], how many boys, how many girls?	31	2.22%
<b>supervisor</b>	The code for the field supervisor	29	2.07%

\* These percentages are calculated by dividing the discrepancies by the total number of samples surveyed, which was 1,399. This number includes those with missing values.

Figure 2.1: Age of Respondents





Figure 2.2: Ethnicity of Respondents



*The results of the double-entry exercise show that the data entry process for PAPI is solid and does not lead to any systematic errors in the estimates.*

The most problematic question involved attaching a code to the respondent's occupation. The reason for the difference between the original and double-entered dataset is likely due to the fact that the interviewer must code the occupation based on the respondent's open-ended answer to the question. There can understandably be some grey area in attaching a specific code to an occupation. In the original dataset, the data entry was more likely to code a respondent's occupation as a household entrepreneur, while the double-entry was more likely to code it as unskilled labour. Future iterations of the survey will seek to narrow the discrepancy in this area.

Despite these differences, the other questions exhibited minimal differences. There were some small differences in how the original versus double-entry coders filled out the question asking about membership of different organizations. However, for the remainder of the questions the difference was minimal. To gain a sense of how identical they are Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the differences in the average age and the average number of respondents that were ethnic minorities. As the figures show, the differences between the two datasets were virtually indistinguishable.

In sum, the results of this double-entry exercise show that the data entry process for PAPI is solid and does not lead to any systematic errors in the estimates.

## Conclusions

This section reviewed each phase of the PAPI implementation process. It shows that the sampling strategy currently used in PAPI outperforms all alternatives and that the data entry process was accurate and

unbiased. The examination of alternative sampling strategies confirmed that PAPI's district sampling strategy is superior to other approaches in terms of reducing the bias in favour of particular districts within a province. It provides the best representation of the actual views of citizens in each individual province.

The checks of the data collection and data entry processes confirmed the reliability and accuracy of the PAPI data. The only potential area of concern was that the re-interviews revealed enough differences to raise some worries that some respondents may have answered on behalf of relatives. While this problem demands further attention, additional analysis revealed that there was no regional pattern to these discrepancies, which means that these deviations did not impact the overall results.

To conclude, the results of this review show that PAPI is the best, most representative survey on governance and public administration in Viet Nam available today. Hopefully, this will provide confidence to the growing number of researchers and policymakers that use PAPI to make evidence-based policy recommendations to assist Viet Nam on its development path.

# CHAPTER 03

## PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE IN 2014 AND COMPARISON OVER TIME

In keeping with earlier PAPI reports, this chapter moves away from national ranking and details provincial performance, with an analysis of trends at dimensional, sub-dimensional and indicator level over time. The report also turns towards local-level policymakers by presenting variations in provincial performance in a comparative perspective. An add-on to this is to compare the performance of the five centrally governed municipalities. This is helpful to identify not only good and poor performers, but also good practices at provincial level that other provinces, especially those with similar socio-economic and geographic characteristics, can learn from and adapt within their localities.

An important message for policymakers and practitioners is that scores should be read as an opportunity to assess performance across a wide range of structural issues, and not as a critique or call to improve a particular score. What PAPI scores reflect are structural

issues citizens encounter when experiencing provincial performance in governance and public administration. These scores act as mirrors of the performance and provincial authorities should focus on finding actionable measures to fix problematic areas. The ultimate objective of PAPI is to provide national and provincial governments with evidence for reference so that they can improve the reflection seen in the mirrors. Any attempts to change PAPI scores without actual performance improvement will not help increase or sustain citizens' satisfaction with what they experience in the everyday performance of their local governments. It is akin to changing the mirror and expecting to get a better reflection.

One note for the 2014 PAPI is that the scores reflect the totals from 61 provinces. Two provinces were dropped from the analysis due to an insufficient number of reliable survey responses to calculate robust provincial estimates<sup>15</sup>.

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
*PAPI scores should be read as an opportunity to assess performance across a wide range of structural issues, and not as a critique or call to improve a particular score.*

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<sup>15</sup> A total of 422 observations in the primary surveys and 383 observations in the re-surveys were obtained from these two provinces. But as there was an insufficient number of reliable responses in these observations, they were not included in the national dataset.

Map 3.1: Provincial Performance in Participation by Quartiles Over Time



## DIMENSION 1: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS

Participation in political, social and economic life is a Vietnamese citizen's constitutional right, enshrined in the country's Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO). Understanding citizens' participation is necessary in order to examine their involvement and role in governance. This first dimension of PAPI, 'Participation at Local Levels', measures citizens' knowledge of their rights and how they exercise them.

The first sub-dimension 'civic knowledge' examines citizens' knowledge of their electoral rights and awareness of institutions that safeguard political participation at grassroots level. The second sub-dimension 'opportunities for participation' assesses citizens' opportunities to participate in the election of representatives to the National Assembly, People's Councils at different levels and village heads. The third sub-dimension 'quality of elections' covers the quality of elections of grassroots citizen representatives, village heads. The fourth sub-dimension 'voluntary contributions' investigates how citizens participate in planning and overseeing commune development projects they contribute to.

When provinces are grouped into four performance groups following PAPI's conventional colour coding<sup>16</sup>, Map 3.1 shows the overall regional patterns. Most of the best performing provinces in 2014 are in the

northern and central regions of the country, with the exception being Ba Ria-Vung Tau in the south. This pattern has existed since 2011, and seems to have become even stronger over the years. Notably, Binh Dinh is the only province that has been in the best performing group in this dimension for four years in a row. At the other end, Dien Bien has been in the poorest performing group for four years. Ha Tinh has been among the top performers for the past three years, while Dak Lak has been in the poorest performing group in the same period of time.

Figure 3.1a shows interesting differences in provincial performance across the eight geographical regions (i.e. the Northwest, the Northeast, the Red River Delta, the North Central, the South Central, the Central Highlands, the Southeast and the Mekong River Delta), as well as among the five centrally governed municipalities (i.e. Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho)<sup>17</sup>. The South Central and Central Highlands seem to have the biggest provincial differences, while the performance of provinces in the Red River Delta, as well as of the five municipalities, is fairly similar. However, in general, the gaps between the provinces are not substantial. When the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are taken into account, the better performers do not necessarily outperform the poorer performers in this dimension.

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*Most of the best performing provinces in 2014 are in the northern and central regions of the country, with the exception being Ba Ria-Vung Tau in the south.*

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<sup>16</sup> The blue provinces represent the best group (75th percentile), the yellow ones the weakest provinces (25th percentile), while the green and the orange group represent the high average and low average performers, respectively.

<sup>17</sup> This grouping of the five centrally governed municipalities aims to compare how these municipalities perform while entitled to be the 'locomotives' for other neighbouring provinces to learn from. They are also compared with their regional peers in the eight geographical groups.

Figure 3.1a: Participation at Local Levels (Dimension 1) by Region




Table 3.1 shows the trends and changes at the sub-dimensional and indicator levels from 2011 to 2014, revealing important policy implications regarding how provinces perform in engaging citizens in policy making and political life. Similar to previous years, in 2014 the sub-dimension 'opportunities for participation' contributes the greatest to the national dimensional score, with 1.66 points on a scale from 0.25-2.25 points. Next comes the 'quality of elections' sub-dimension with 1.45 points. The sub-dimension on 'civic knowledge' has a national mean of 1.00, while the sub-dimension on 'voluntary contributions' contributes the least, averaging 0.81 points.

Table 3.1 also reveals how convergent or divergent provinces are when the

median value of each indicator is taken into account. For instance, for half of the provinces across the country more than half of the respondents reported they had the opportunity to participate in decision-making when a public project is started, while in another half only between 17.6% and 50% of the respondents did so.

For a longer-term perspective, provincial scores in 2014 are compared to 2011. As shown in Figure 3.1b, Ca Mau, Binh Thuan and Thai Binh significantly improved their performance levels compared to 2011 ( $p > 0.05$ ). On the other hand, 35 provinces experienced declines of more than 5%, with the dimensional scores of Son La, Ninh Thuan, Ben Tre and Tien Giang plummeting by more than 20%.

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*For half of the provinces across the country more than half of the respondents reported they had the opportunity to participate in decision-making when a public project is started, while in another half only between 17.6% and 50% of the respondents did so.*

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Table 3.1: List of Indicators on Participation at Local Levels (Dimension 1)


Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
<b>Total Dimension</b>	<b>Dimension 1: Participation at Local Levels</b>		1	10	5.30	5.16	5.14	4.91	4.83	5.00	Minimum Median Maximum	3.96 4.98 5.89	Ninh Thuan Ninh Binh Quang Tri
Sub-Dimension 1	Civic Knowledge		0.25	2.5	1.11	1.06	1.04	1.00	0.97	1.03	Minimum Median Maximum	0.63 1.01 1.41	Ninh Thuan Nghe An Quang Tri
Sub-Dimension 2	Opportunities for Participation		0.25	2.5	1.88	1.82	1.75	1.66	1.62	1.69	Minimum Median Maximum	1.40 1.63 1.92	Phu Yen Hau Giang Binh Duong
Sub-Dimension 3	Quality of Elections		0.25	2.5	1.45	1.47	1.49	1.45	1.42	1.48	Minimum Median Maximum	1.09 1.53 1.85	Tra Vinh Lam Dong Dak Nong
Sub-Dimension 4	Voluntary Contributions		0.25	2.5	0.85	0.81	0.87	0.81	0.78	0.83	Minimum Median Maximum	0.57 0.81 1.20	Bac Kan Lang Son Binh Dinh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Civic Knowledge	d101a, d101b, d101d	0	3	1.76	1.56	1.46	1.34	1.30	1.39	Minimum Median Maximum	0.97 1.35 1.69	Ninh Thuan Lai Chau Thai Binh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Knows Grassroots Democracy Decree (%)	d102a	0%	100%	34.14%	30.42%	27.37%	28.82%	26.29%	31.34%	Minimum Median Maximum	11.53% 29.43% 52.77%	Tien Giang Kien Giang Da Nang
S1. Civic Knowledge	Aware of "People Know, People Decide..." (%)	d102b	0%	100%	64.66%	67.51%	65.47%	63.87%	60.00%	67.73%	Minimum Median Maximum	18.45% 73.77% 95.21%	Ninh Thuan Binh Dinh Thai Binh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Correct Term Limit of 2.5 Years (%)	d108	0%	100%	6.97%	7.26%	9.60%	8.91%	7.22%	10.59%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.78% 8.06% 36.57%	Ninh Binh Kien Giang Quang Tri
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Voted in Last Commune People's Council Election (%)	d101b1	0%	100%	70.57%	65.29%	57.49%	51.27%	48.85%	53.70%	Minimum Median Maximum	28.23% 51.17% 74.63%	Da Nang Binh Phuoc Long An

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey	Scale		National Mean					National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces	
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Voted in Last National Assembly Election (%)	d101d1	0%	100%	65.94%	55.66%	48.40%	42.30%	39.65%	44.95%	Minimum Median Maximum	21.81% 39.58% 62.72%	Hung Yen Hau Giang BRVT	
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Village Head Elected (%)	d103a	0%	100%	83.38%	85.57%	88.49%	89.09%	87.40%	90.78%	Minimum Median Maximum	70.12% 91.24% 99.99%	Ninh Thuan Hung Yen Hai Duong	
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Participated in Village Head Election (%)	d107	0%	100%	69.25%	72.87%	71.33%	65.74%	63.09%	68.39%	Minimum Median Maximum	34.29% 63.22% 84.83%	Ha Giang Vinh Long BRVT	
S3. Quality of Elections	More than One Candidate (%)	d105	0%	100%	51.50%	52.27%	53.81%	52.37%	48.51%	56.22%	Minimum Median Maximum	15.52% 53.62% 86.01%	Tra Vinh Son La Dak Nong	
S3. Quality of Elections	Invited to Participate (%)	d106	0%	100%	57.72%	58.38%	60.36%	58.94%	55.35%	62.52%	Minimum Median Maximum	24.15% 60.69% 90.21%	Tra Vinh Soc Trang Quang Tri	
S3. Quality of Elections	Paper Ballot was Used (%)	d107a	0%	100%	86.47%	89.15%	89.72%	88.69%	85.45%	91.93%	Minimum Median Maximum	16.56% 88.13% 100%	Dien Bien Hau Giang Tay Ninh	
S3. Quality of Elections	Votes were Counted Publicly (%)	d107d	0%	100%	60.28%	63.63%	65.94%	63.15%	57.69%	68.60%	Minimum Median Maximum	8.79% 80.88% 99.95%	Tra Vinh Quang Ninh Gia Lai	
S3. Quality of Elections	Candidate was not Suggested (%)	d107b	0%	100%	42.93%	47.92%	41.49%	51.17%	42.14%	60.21%	Minimum Median Maximum	1.33% 49.01% 99.91%	Da Nang Lao Cai Tay Ninh	
S3. Quality of Elections	Voted for Winner	d107c	Min	Max	90.74%	88.66%	91.71%	92.94%	91.39%	94.48%	Minimum Median Maximum	63.60% 93.43% 100%	Hau Giang Thai Binh Ha Nam	

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Voluntary Contribution to Project (%)	d109ba	0%	100%	47.90%	47.28%	44.98%	40.09%	36.71%	43.48%	Minimum Median Maximum	7.44% 34.29% 76.42%	Binh Thuan Lang Son Lai Chau
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Community Monitoring Board, Monitors Contribution (%)	d109bb	0%	100%	10.97%	8.56%	13.89%	11.13%	9.15%	13.11%	Minimum Median Maximum	0% 8.34% 34.28%	Multiple Ha Tinh Thai Binh
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Voluntary Contribution Recorded (%)	d109bc	0%	100%	69.94%	71.12%	75.25%	75.95%	73.02%	78.89%	Minimum Median Maximum	42.61% 77.18% 98.85%	Hai Phong Vinh Long Ha Tinh
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Participated in Decision-Making to Start Project (%)	d109bd	0%	100%	34.42%	37.29%	45.28%	51.73%	48.65%	54.80%	Minimum Median Maximum	17.64% 51.35% 81.36%	Hai Phong Lang Son Hai Duong
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Provided Input to Project Design (%)	d109be	0%	100%	21.91%	22.78%	27.96%	29.43%	26.57%	32.28%	Minimum Median Maximum	1.15% 31.14% 61.57%	Bac Ninh Tra Vinh Binh Dinh

Note: (\*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum. For data in the 2014 PAPI and later iterations, national weights rather than provincial weights are used in generating national level statistics.

Figure 3.1b: Changes in Performance in Participation (% - 2014 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2014 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant

## Civic Knowledge

This sub-dimension shines light on what citizens know about their political and civic rights, and thus on how local governments have disseminated GRDO principles to citizens. To measure civic knowledge, respondents are asked if elections for the chairperson of the commune/ward People's Committee, members of the commune/ward People's Council and provincial representatives to the National Assembly in their respective commune/ward have taken place in the past five years. By the letter of the law, the first possible answer is meant to be 'false' since this position is nominated, while the last two are elected posts. In addition, citizens are asked if they know about the GRDO, in particular the phrase "People know, people discuss, people do, people verify" – a short, colloquial description of the GRDO – and about the correct office terms for village heads they elect from their communities.

The national mean of this sub-dimension is 1.00 points on a scale of 0.25-2.5 points. Quang Tri scores the highest with 1.41, more than twice the lowest score of 0.63 by Ninh Thuan. Compared to 2011, there is a decline of 11% in this sub-dimension, caused mainly by the fall in the national mean score of citizens' knowledge of elected positions (see Table 3.1). One explanation for this trend is that memories of the 2011 National Assembly and People's Councils elections have faded over time. This fading effect will be tested in 2016 when the next elections are convened. Thai Binh scores the highest in this indicator, while Ninh Thuan scores the lowest.

Citizen awareness of the GRDO has declined over time as well. At the national level, an average of 28.8% know about the ordinance, a slight increase compared to 27.4% last year. However, compared to the 34% of 2011 there has been a 15% decline. The best performing province is Da Nang, with over half of

respondents knowing about the ordinance, compared to only 12% in Tien Giang.

As in previous years, more people know the phrase "People know, people discuss, people do, people verify". But after some ups and downs over the years, the 2014 national mean is 63.9%, practically no improvement from 64.7% in 2011. Similar to the last couple of years, in Thai Binh almost everybody is aware of the phrase. Ninh Thuan remains the lowest scoring province, with one fourth of the population knowing about it, much less than the one third found last year.

The last indicator of the sub-dimension measures citizen knowledge of the duration of terms of a village/residential group head, which according to the GRDO is 2.5 years. At a national level about 8.9% answered correctly, lower than the 9.5% last year, but still higher than the 7% in the baseline year of 2011. Even in Quang Tri, the best performing province, only just over one third know the correct term, while the figure is less than 1% in Ninh Binh.

## Opportunities for Participation

This sub-dimension highlights citizens' experiences in participating in elections of representatives to the National Assembly, People's Councils and villages. It also points to how active local governments are in helping citizens exercise their rights to political participation. Here, citizens are asked about whether they voted in the most recent elections within the past five years.

Overall, this sub-dimension contributes the most to the dimensional score, with a national mean value of 1.66 points on a scale from 0.25-2.25 in 2014. However, the downward trend has continued, falling from 1.88 in 2011 to 1.75 last year (see Table 3.1). Binh Duong is the best performer in this sub-

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*Compared to 2011, there is a decline of 11% in the civic knowledge sub-dimension, caused mainly by the fall in the national mean score of citizens' knowledge of elected positions.*

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dimension with 1.92 points, while Phu Yen only scores 1.4. As mentioned above, the decline could be explained by the fact that people had a fresher memory of National Assembly and People's Council elections in 2011 than in subsequent years.

Indeed, the number of respondents in 2014 that recall voting in the 2011 elections of commune People's Council and National Assembly members amounted to 51.3% and 42.3% respectively, a sharp decline from 70.6% and 65.9% in 2011. In general, the number of citizens participating in such elections as revealed in this sub-dimension is lower than reported in official figures<sup>18</sup>, possibly because of the practice of proxy voting whereby a voter could have voted on behalf of other persons in the same household

Village head elections seem to be one of the aspects best implemented among the requirements by listed in the GRDO. At the national aggregate level, 89% of the respondents in 2014 confirmed their village heads took office after elections, increasing from 83.4% in 2011. Ninh Thuan, the lowest scoring province, had 70% of respondents participate in village head elections, while the number is 100% in Hai Duong.

On personal voting experiences in village head elections, about 66% of respondents reported they went in person to the elections to vote, slightly less than in the baseline year of 2011. Ha Giang had the lowest number of respondents with personal experiences of voting (34%), while Ba Ria-Vung Tau had the highest (85%).

## Quality of Village Elections

The quality of village elections is assessed by indicators measuring citizens' free choice of candidates, the way the elections are conducted to ensure fair selection and transparency, and whether winners are properly announced to the public.

At the national level, the sub-dimension scores 1.45 in a range from 0.25 to 2.5, exactly the 2011 level, and a slight decrease compared to 2012 and 2013. Dak Nong scores highest with 1.85, while Tra Vinh scores only 1.09 (see Table 3.1).

At the national level, around 59% of respondents said they were invited to the most recent village head election, consistent with previous years. As in 2013, Quang Tri holds the highest percentage (90%), almost four times more than Tra Vinh (24%). Critically, only about half of respondents said that their elections had at least two candidates to choose from, as required by the GRDO. This presents no improvement over the last four years. Dak Nong is the best performer, with 86% of respondents confirming they chose their village heads from at least two candidates, while in Tra Vinh the election is mostly a formality due to the lack of a second candidate.

In most elections paper ballots, the correct method according to the GRDO, were used. At the national aggregate level, 89% of the respondents confirmed this voting method had been used, similar to previous years' findings. In Tay Ninh all respondents confirmed this method, while in Dien Bien only 16.6% did so. At a national level 63% of the respondents reported that votes

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*Village head elections seem to be one of the aspects best implemented by the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance.*

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<sup>18</sup> See Resolution No. 434 NQ/HĐBC dated 1 June 2011 on the results of the National Assembly election in 2011, where much higher provincial proportions of votes were recorded

were counted publicly, presenting no major change from 2013. In Gia Lai, all respondents confirmed public counting of votes, while in Tra Vinh only 8.8% did so.

One important note about the quality of village head elections is whether or not a candidate is suggested to voters. At the national aggregate level such suggestions were not made to over half of respondents, a much higher rate than the 43% in 2011. In Tay Ninh, no candidates were suggested to voters, while this was only the case for 1.3% of Da Nang respondents.

Overall, the elections seem to not be competitive. As found in previous years, over 90% said they voted for the winner. Competition was highest in Hau Giang, where only 63% said they voted for the winner.

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*Overall, the elections seem to not be competitive. As found in previous years, over 90% said they voted for the winner.*

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### Voluntary Contributions

Voluntary, instead of forceful, contributions to building and/or remodeling community infrastructure, such as cultural houses, roads or schools, is seen as a form of voluntary, active citizen participation. Once citizens contribute voluntarily, they tend to participate more actively in different project processes, from initiating to overseeing roles. This sub-dimension measures citizens' experiences in exercising these participatory rights.

In 2014 the mean score of this sub-dimension at national level declined to 0.81 on a scale from 0.25 to 2.25, lower than 0.85 in 2011 when the first national PAPI got started (see Table 3.1). This makes it the lowest among the four sub-dimensions in the first PAPI dimension, as also observed in previous years. Even Binh Dinh, the highest performer, only reached 1.2 points, less than half the possible score. Bac Kan is the lowest performing province, gaining only 0.57.

The first indicator shows the share of respondents who voluntarily contributed to a public project in their community over the last 12 months in the form of cash, in-kind or labour. At the national level, starting with a moderate share of 48% in 2011, a declining trend can be seen as the share only reached 40% in 2014. In the best performing province, Lai Chau, three fourths of the respondents contributed, as opposed to only 7.4% in Binh Thuan.

The proportion of respondents confirming that their contributions were recorded in a bookkeeping system remains constant at 76%, compared to 75% in 2013, a slight improvement from 70% in 2011. Hai Phong has the lowest proportion with 42.6% of the respondents confirming this, less than half of that in Ha Tinh (99%).

A more worrisome fact is that over the years there is no positive change in the aspect that spending of voluntary contributions should be monitored by Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs) and/or People's Inspection Boards (PIBs), as regulated in the GRDO. With some minor fluctuations, from 2011 to 2014 only around 10% of respondents nationwide confirmed that their contribution is monitored correctly. Even in Thai Binh, the best performer, two thirds believed that the monitoring was undertaken by local authorities, village heads or not undertaken at all. In Binh Duong and Tra Vinh, for instance, no one could confirm the correct form of monitoring. This is in line with the findings presented in the dimension 'Vertical Accountability' regarding the performance of PIBs and CISBs.

On a more positive note, the share of respondents participating in the decision-making process of community projects they contribute to increased to 52%, up from 45% in 2013 and 34% in 2011. Hai Duong had 81% of the respondents report participation, while Hai Phong only had 17.6%.

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*Over the years there is no positive change in the aspect that spending of voluntary contributions should be monitored by Community Investment Supervision Boards and/or People's Inspection Boards.*

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Similarly, the share of respondents providing input to the design of community projects increased steadily over the years, reaching 29.4% in 2014 compared to 22% in 2011. Binh Dinh has the best result with 61.6% of respondents having engaged in such a process, while in Bac Ninh the proportion is only 1.2%.

In summary, participation at the local level remains limited in the aspects PAPI measures, with three out of four sub-dimensions constituting the first PAPI dimension declining in scores compared to the 2011 baselines. This is critical as participation in political life is important for citizens to exercise their democratic rights and do their part to help improve local governance. Village head elections remain largely symbolic, with practices

such as having fewer than two candidates and candidates being suggested by the authorities in place. The sub-dimension 'voluntary contribution' saw a more positive sign, as a larger share of citizens have been involved in decision-making and designing of community projects.


Most of the improvement in this dimension would not require a large financial investment. It, however, needs local governments' strong commitment to engage citizens in political life and policy making in practical terms and comply with state regulations on organizing elections.

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*Participation at the local level remains limited in the aspects PAPI measures, with three out of the four sub-dimensions declining in scores compared to the 2011 baselines.*

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Map 3.2: Provincial Performance in Transparency by Quartiles Over Time



## DIMENSION 2: TRANSPARENCY

PAPI measures citizens' "rights to know" about state policies that affect their everyday life and livelihood. 'Transparency' in the three sub-dimensional areas 'poverty lists', 'commune budgets' and 'local land-use planning and pricing' is the focus of the second dimension of PAPI. Information relating to the three sub-dimensions is required by the GRDO to be made publicly available in a transparent manner so citizens across the country can "know, discuss, do and verify".

Similar to what is observed in Dimension 1, there are discernible regional patterns over time in Dimension 2. Map 3.2 presents the four quartiles of provincial performance in ensuring transparency in the areas PAPI measures over the course of four years. It shows that more northern and central provinces are found in the group of better performance than southern ones. It also depicts consistent performance in a number of provinces. For instance, Nam Dinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri and Ba Ria-Vung Tau have been in the best performing group for four consecutive years. Thai Binh has been in the top performing group for the last three years. In the poorest performing group, Bac Lieu and Kien Giang have been included for four years since 2011, and Khanh Hoa for three years since 2012.

Figure 3.2a shows provincial performance in a regional setting. Of the eight regions, the Red River Delta and the Mekong River Delta see the largest variations between provinces. For example, although Nam Dinh is a good performer within the Red River Delta, the province does not necessarily outperform provinces in other regions when the confidence intervals are taken into account. The Central Highlands provinces are closely clustered at the average level in this dimension. The same observation applies

to the five centrally governed municipalities (see 'Cities' graph in Figure 3.2a).

At the provincial level, the 2014 findings show that there has been a marginal decrease in provincial performance in two out of three sub-dimensions constituting the 'Transparency' dimension when compared to the 2013 findings. Table 3.2 shows the decrease in transparency in poverty lists and commune budgets, but also some increase in transparency of land-use planning and pricing. Nonetheless, among the three sub-dimensions 'land-use planning and pricing' is still the least transparent (scoring 1.72 on a scale from 0.33 to 3.33), with provincial scores clustered around an average level (ranging from 1.24-1.99 points). However, this sub-dimension is slowly catching up with the sub-dimension 'commune budget', which scores 1.78 in 2014. 'Poverty list' is the most transparent area, scoring 2.25, or 25% higher than the other two sub-dimensions.

The positive change trend in this dimension from 2011 to 2014 is among the largest in PAPI over time (see Figure 3.2b). Compared to 2011, the dimensional mean score values of five provinces have increased by more than 20%. Tra Vinh has experienced an exceptional improvement of approximately 26.7%. Hau Giang, Quang Ngai, Lam Dong and Vinh Long also witnessed positive change. Overall, as many as 30 provinces in total showed improvements of more than 5% (although this is a smaller number compared with that in 2013). Only eight provinces declined more than 5% compared to their 2011 benchmarks, with Son La continuing to see the steepest drop (-13%) and Ha Tinh also experiencing a drop. About a third of all provinces saw little change in 2014, with mean scores ranging between  $\pm 5\%$ .

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*As many as 30 provinces in total showed improvements of more than 5% in 2014 compared to 2011.*

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Figure 3.2a: Transparency (Dimension 2) by Region





Table 3.2: List of Indicators on Transparency (Dimension 2)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
<b>Total Dimension</b>	<b>Dimension 2: Transparency of Local Decision-Making</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5.47</b>	<b>5.61</b>	<b>5.80</b>	<b>5.74</b>	<b>5.65</b>	<b>5.84</b>	<b>Minimum</b> <b>Median</b> <b>Maximum</b>	<b>4.80</b> <b>5.81</b> <b>6.82</b>	<b>Lai Chau</b> <b>Ca Mau</b> <b>Nam Dinh</b>
Sub-Dimension 1	Poverty Lists		0.33	3.3	2.15	2.23	2.28	2.25	2.19	2.31	Minimum Median Maximum	1.84 2.34 2.76	Tay Ninh Hung Yen Nam Dinh
Sub-Dimension 2	Commune Budgets		0.33	3.3	1.76	1.77	1.85	1.78	1.74	1.81	Minimum Median Maximum	1.44 1.78 2.33	Bac Ninh Cao Bang Lang Son
Sub-Dimension 3	Land-Use Planning/Pricing		0.34	3.4	1.56	1.61	1.68	1.72	1.69	1.74	Minimum Median Maximum	1.24 1.74 1.99	Lai Chau Dak Lak Binh Duong
S1. Poverty Lists	Poverty List Published in Last 12 Months	d202	0%	100%	53.55%	58.26%	58.32%	58.67%	54.80%	62.55%	Minimum Median Maximum	27.56% 65.79% 88.57%	Can Tho Thai Nguyen Quang Binh
S1. Poverty Lists	Type 1 Errors on Poverty List (% Disagree)	d202a	0%	100%	39.85%	37.04%	35.21%	36.15%	33.40%	38.90%	Minimum Median Maximum	10.77% 37.19% 61.53%	Hai Phong Ben Tre Lai Chau
S1. Poverty Lists	Type 2 Errors on Poverty List (% Disagree)	d202b	0%	100%	34.66%	34.11%	32.24%	33.96%	30.95%	36.97%	Minimum Median Maximum	5.36% 36.90% 63.74%	Long An Yen Bai Gia Lai
S2. Commune Budgets	Commune Budget is Made Available (%)	d203	0%	100%	29.80%	34.12%	37.38%	36.33%	33.14%	39.53%	Minimum Median Maximum	11.44% 40.29% 88.22%	Tay Ninh Hung Yen Thai Binh
S2. Commune Budgets	Respondent Read Commune Budget (%)	d203a	0%	100%	37.38%	34.07%	34.23%	32.51%	29.28%	35.73%	Minimum Median Maximum	7.58% 33.19% 66.54%	Lai Chau Hai Duong Tra Vinh
S2. Commune Budgets	Believe in Accuracy of Budget (%)	d203b	0%	100%	69.66%	73.34%	74.04%	73.98%	71.22%	76.74%	Minimum Median Maximum	36.97% 75.96% 94.27%	Gia Lai Tra Vinh Cao Bang

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Aware of Local Land Plans (%)	d204	0%	100%	19.99%	19.61%	20.82%	16.24%	14.31%	18.17%	Minimum Median Maximum	4.24% 13.86% 37.18%	Bac Lieu Son La BRVT
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Comment on Local Land Plans (%)	d205	0%	100%	6.19%	6.49%	7.00%	4.95%	3.99%	5.92%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.13% 4.72% 19.71%	Yen Bai Quang Ngai Lao Cai
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Land Plan Acknowledges Your Concerns (%)	d205a	0%	100%	81.12%	82.65%	86.77%	80.52%	72.23%	88.80%	Minimum Median Maximum	8.80% 91.76% 100%	Lai Chau Lao Cai Multiple
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Impact of Land Plan on Your Family (3=Beneficial)	d206	1	3	2.05	2.09	2.04	2.12	2.07	2.18	Minimum Median Maximum	1.58 2.05 2.72	Hai Phong Yen Bai Bac Lieu
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Did not Lose Land as a Result of Land Plan	d207	0%	100%	71.38%	74.91%	76.21%	81.18%	79.12%	83.24%	Minimum Median Maximum	37.63% 81.18% 94.90%	Son La Da Nang Binh Dinh
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Compensation Close to Market Value (%)	d207a(^), d207aa & d207ba	0%	100%	12.86%	17.96%	18.84%	28.10%	22.54%	33.67%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.19% 26.30% 85.36%	Binh Phuoc Ha Nam Ninh Thuan
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Informed of Land Usage (%)	d207c	0%	100%	93.12%	90.66%	92.89%	82.91%	76.02%	89.80%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.59% 93.67% 100%	Dak Lak Tuyen Quang Multiple
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Land Use for Original Purpose (%)	d207d	0%	100%	85.40%	82.64%	85.23%	85.69%	80.90%	90.48%	Minimum Median Maximum	0% 95.80% 100%	Tra Vinh Vinh Long Multiple
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Know Where to Go to Get Land Price Information (%)	d208	0%	100%	38.25%	42.76%	49.85%	50.04%	47.37%	52.71%	Minimum Median Maximum	22.01% 51.16% 85.07%	Lai Chau Binh Dinh Binh Duong

Note: (\*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum. For data in the 2014 PAPI and later iterations, national weights rather than provincial weights are used in generating national level statistics.

Figure 3.2b: Changes in Performance in Transparency (% - 2014 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2014 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant

## Transparency in Lists of Poor Households

The first indicator of this sub-dimension measures the share of citizens aware of the publication of lists of poor households in their commune during the year. The 2014 findings show that the level of citizen awareness has been stable over the past two years, although there has been a positive 10% change from the 2011 baseline (see Table 3.2). At the national level, 59% of the population said they are aware that the list of poor households was published in the past year. About 90% of respondents in Quang Binh know about the list, compared to just 28% in Can Tho.

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*There is a stable trend in citizen assessment over the past two years, with about 36% of respondents nationwide agreeing that truly poor households are not included in the list.*

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The remaining two indicators reflect how citizens experience the quality of poor household listings, which indirectly indicates the level of transparency in the process of nominating poor households for state subsidies from local governments. There is a stable trend in citizen assessment over the past two years, with about 36% of respondents nationwide agreeing that truly poor households are not included in the list. In Lai Chau about 62% shared their agreement, while only 11% in Hai Phong confirmed that the lists are free of that error.

On the second type of error, where non-poor households are included in the lists, 34% of respondents nationwide said the lists are not free of this type of error, about the same proportion as in 2013. In Long An, only 5.4% agreed that the lists are ridden with this type of error, while in Lai Chau 62% agreed.

The low proportion of Nam Dinh respondents confirming the two types of errors made the province top this sub-dimension, with an aggregate score of 2.76 points. At the other end of the spectrum, Tay Ninh scores 1.84. The national mean is 2.25, only slightly higher than the 2011 score of 2.15 points.

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*While citizen awareness of commune budgets and expenditures is on the rise, the share of the population who actually reads this information has fallen from 37.4% in 2011 to only 32.5% in 2014.*

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## Transparency in Commune Budgets

This sub-dimension reveals the level of transparency in commune budgets, an important GRDO requirement that communes must comply with to ensure citizens' "rights to know". Knowing how commune budgets are used will also help keep local public officials under check and prevent possible diversion of public funds for private use.

Starting from a moderate national average of 1.76 (on a scale from 0.33-3.33 points) in 2011, the sub-dimension improved to 1.85 in 2013 but declined to 1.78 in 2014 (see Table 3.2). Lang Son performed the best, scoring 2.33 points, while Bac Ninh scored only 1.44.

When it comes to whether or not information about the commune budget is made publicly available for citizens to access, 36.3% of respondents nationwide in 2014 were aware of the information. This presents no significant change since 2012. Remarkably, Thai Binh has been the best performer in this regard for three years in a row, with 88% of respondents being aware of the information in 2014, compared to 77% in 2013. At the other end of the scale, only 11% of the respondents in Tay Ninh were aware of the budget information in 2014.

While citizen awareness of commune budgets and expenditures is on the rise, the share of the population who actually reads this information has fallen from 37.4% in 2011 to only 32.5% in 2014, a drop of 13%. In Tra Vinh, two thirds of the respondents read publicised commune budget notices, while just 7.58% did so in Lai Chau.

A more positive note is that about 74% of those who read the notices trusted the accuracy of the information. This has been stable over the past two years. In Cao Bang about 94% of the respondents found the information trustworthy, while only one third of those in Gia Lai believed the information was accurate.

## Transparency of Local Land-Use Planning and Price Frames

Measuring transparency in 'land-use planning and pricing' contributes to tracking local governments' performance in implementing land policy changes, in addition to compliance with the GRDO to make the information universally transparent.

Findings from the past four national PAPI iterations show that this sub-dimension continues to score the lowest, although the national mean score has seen a steady but insignificant rise from 1.56 in 2011 to 1.72 in 2014 (see Table 3.2). Binh Duong performed the best with a score of 1.99, while Lai Chau scored only 1.24 points, the lowest of all in this sub-dimension.

There was barely any improvement in the publicity of local land-use plans over the course of four years since 2011. In 2014, the share of respondents nationwide aware of local land-use plans dropped to 16%, from a constant proportion of around 20% in the period from 2011-2013. In Bac Lieu just 4% of respondents knew about the plans. Ba Ria-Vung Tau, the best performer in both 2013 and 2014 in this indicator, saw a decline from almost 50% to 37% in just one year.

Of those informed of local land-use plans in 2014, only a small share of respondents (5%) had the opportunity to comment on them, a slight decline from 6.2% in 2011. Lao Cai topped the list with 20% saying they commented on the plans, while practically no one in Yen Bai enjoyed the same opportunity. One bright spot here is that among those who provided comments, around 80.5% said the plans acknowledged their comments. However, there are striking differences between provinces, exemplified by the proportion of 100% in Tra Vinh compared to 9% in Lai Chau.

Over the years, the impact of land-use plans on households has remained constant. The value '1' is assigned to respondents whose households felt no impact, '2' to households with negative impacts and '3' to households that benefited from such plans. The national

mean is 2.12, about the same as previous years' figures. Bac Lieu had the most people with a positive impact (2.72), while Hai Phong had the least (1.58).

The share of citizens who did not lose land as a result of recent land planning was 81% in 2014. This indicates a downward trend of land loss as compared to the share of 71% reported in 2011. Nearly 95% of participants in Binh Dinh reported no land loss. This is in large contrast to Son La where two thirds of respondents experienced some loss – a similar pattern found in 2013.

Of note is the fact that in 2014 there has been an upward trend in the share of respondents who said that compensation for land being revoked got close to the market level. At the national level, about 28% of respondents reported that the offered prices were close to market values, a rise from only 13% in 2011 and 19% in 2013. In Ninh Thuan, the top performer in 2014, 85% reported the offered price to be competitive to the market rate, compared to only 41% in Hung Yen, the best performer in 2013. On the contrary, almost all respondents in Binh Phuoc said that the compensation was lower than the market value.

About 83% of those who lost land due to recent land planning were informed about the intended use of the land being revoked, a significant drop from around 90% in previous years. While in Hoa Binh almost every respondent was informed, the number was only 1% in Dak Lak, a much more dramatic gap than what was found last year. A similar variation is found in regard to whether or not the land-use purpose remained consistent. Hoa Binh again tops the list with 100% of respondents confirming the purposes were unchanged, while everyone in Tra Vinh confirmed the opposite. At the national aggregate level, about the same level as in the previous years (86%) confirmed no change in purpose.

When asked about access to official land price information, about half of respondents nationwide could give an answer, the same level as 2013, and a large increase from 38% in

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*In 2014 there has been an upward trend in the share of respondents who said that compensation for land being revoked got close to the market level.*

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2011. In Binh Duong, 85% of the respondents knew where to get such information, while only 22% knew this in Lai Chau.

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*While transparency in 'poverty lists' remained unchanged and in 'commune budget' declined slightly, transparency in 'land-use planning and pricing' continued to improve in 2014, despite the consistent lower scores.*


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In summary, this dimension sees mixed signs and suggests room for improvement in all of the three sub-dimensions. While transparency in 'poverty lists' remained unchanged and in 'commune budget' declined slightly, transparency in 'land-use planning and pricing' continued to improve in 2014, despite the consistent lower scores compared to the other two sub-dimensions. In particular, the transparency of commune budgets is still weak when only eight out of 100 people know of, have read and trust the publicized notices and information about their communes' budgets and expenditures. Transparency in land-use plans has also seen a mixed trend. While the price of

compensation moved significantly towards market levels, the disclosure of land-use plans and land-use purpose has deteriorated. It will be interesting to see if these diverging trends in land plan transparency continue and analyse why they exist, given that land remains one of the most contentious areas for contemporary Vietnamese society.

To improve transparency in a sustainable way, it is important for local governments to find and adapt different means of disclosing trustworthy information to citizens with different demographic backgrounds. This could be done through government portals at provincial and district levels, notice boards at the commune level or posts and loudspeakers at the village level.

Map 3.3: Provincial Performance in Vertical Accountability by Quartiles Over Time



## DIMENSION 3: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

As in previous PAPI iterations, the third dimension measures key 'Vertical Accountability' aspects, including 'interactions with local authorities' and the coverage and effectiveness of PIBs and CISBs. These mechanisms, in accordance with the GRDO, help to make local governments and public officials accountable to their citizens in the operationalization of governance functions. These institutions are mandated to realize citizens' rights to "discuss" and "verify" as per the GRDO.

Map 3.3 displays interesting changes over time when taking the four quartiles into account. The North Central provinces are among the top and high average performers over the past four years, with Quang Binh and Quang Tri in the best performing group for four years in a row. Both the Red River Delta and South Central Coast provinces have witnessed unstable performance, while poorer performers are concentrated in the Northwest, Central Highlands and Southeast regions. The north-western province of Lai Chau has been in the poorest performing group for four consecutive years. Notably, more southern provinces have joined the top performing group in 2014 than in previous years (with Ben Tre and Vinh Long joining Long An and Hau Giang).

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*Of the eight geographical regions, even performance between provinces is found in the Northwest, Central Highlands and Southeast regions.*

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Figure 3.3a confirms the regional patterns found in 2014. Of the eight geographical regions, even performance between provinces is found in the Northwest, Central Highlands and Southeast regions. In the Mekong River Delta, except for Vinh Long (the best performer in the region) and Can Tho (the poorest performer in the region), the other provinces also show some level of evenness in their vertical accountability performance. The most uneven pattern is found in the Red River Delta, where three

layers of performance can be found. Vinh Phuc, Ha Nam and Nam Dinh score much better than the other provinces, while Hai Phong stands out as the poorest performer of all in the region. Hai Phong, with a score of 4.51, is also the overall poorest performer in this dimension, as opposed to Quang Tri (with a score of 6.67), on a scale of 1-10 points. Uneven performance is also found among the centrally governed municipalities. Da Nang outperformed Can Tho and Hai Phong in 2014, and Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City were also behind Da Nang (see the 'Cities' graph in Figure 3.3a).

As Table 3.3 presents, vertical accountability through citizen interaction with local authorities and the citizen monitoring mechanisms of PIBs and CISBs has steadily improved over time. The largest contribution to this improvement is citizen recognition of the presence and effectiveness of CISBs, which are set up to monitor community projects (with an incremental increase in the sub-dimensional score from 1.78 in 2011 to 1.94 in 2014). The sub-dimensions on the performance of local authorities' interactions with citizens on matters of concern and the performance of PIBs have seen more fluctuation over time, although some improvement can be seen in citizen-government interactions.

On provincial improvements since 2011, Figure 3.3b shows that 23 provinces have made significant improvements, with their scores increasing between 5% and 21%. Vinh Long, An Giang and Ben Tre have made the most impressive progress in this dimension. In contrast, eight provinces have seen declines in dimensional scores by more than 5%, headlined by Thai Binh at -12.6%. The remaining provinces have seen minimal changes since 2011.

Figure 3.3a: Vertical Accountability (Dimension 3) by Region





Table 3.3: List of Indicators on Vertical Accountability (Dimension 3)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
<b>Total Dimension</b>	<b>Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5.50</b>	<b>5.58</b>	<b>5.65</b>	<b>5.73</b>	<b>5.67</b>	<b>5.79</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>4.51</b>	<b>Hai Phong</b>
<i>Sub-Dimension 1</i>	<i>Interactions with Local Authorities</i>		0.33	3.3	1.87	1.88	1.78	1.85	1.82	1.87	<i>Median</i>	1.88	<i>Hung Yen</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 2</i>	<i>People's Inspection Boards</i>		0.33	3.3	1.85	1.87	1.97	1.94	1.90	1.98	<i>Maximum</i>	2.33	<i>An Giang</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 3</i>	<i>Community Investment Supervision Boards</i>		0.34	3.4	1.78	1.83	1.90	1.94	1.91	1.97	<i>Minimum</i>	1.46	<i>Da Nang</i>
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contacted Village Head (%)	d301a1	0%	100%	18.54%	18.07%	14.01%	16.70%	15.29%	18.11%	<i>Median</i>	1.91	<i>Ninh Thuan</i>
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contacted Commune People's Committee (%)	d301b1	0%	100%	12.20%	12.01%	8.77%	11.98%	10.63%	13.33%	<i>Maximum</i>	2.34	<i>Ben Tre</i>
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contact with Village Head Successful (%)	d301a1	0%	100%	87.96%	86.82%	84.37%	86.37%	82.74%	89.99%	<i>Minimum</i>	1.33	<i>Quang Binh</i>
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contact with Commune Successful (%)	d301b2	0%	100%	80.49%	82.82%	77.80%	80.94%	75.80%	86.08%	<i>Median</i>	1.94	<i>Hai Phong</i>
											<i>Maximum</i>	2.36	<i>Bac Ninh</i>
											<i>Minimum</i>	0%	<i>Quang Tri</i>
											<i>Median</i>	16.43%	<i>Hung Yen</i>
											<i>Maximum</i>	52.42%	<i>Ha Tinh</i>
											<i>Minimum</i>	0%	<i>Da Nang</i>
											<i>Median</i>	10.22%	<i>Hung Yen</i>
											<i>Maximum</i>	29.01%	<i>Quang Nam</i>
											<i>Minimum</i>	3.17%	<i>Vinh Phuc</i>
											<i>Median</i>	88.18%	<i>Hung Yen</i>
											<i>Maximum</i>	100%	<i>Dong Nai</i>
											<i>Minimum</i>	2.40%	<i>Ca Mau</i>
											<i>Median</i>	80.19%	<i>Hai Duong</i>
											<i>Maximum</i>	100%	<i>Vinh Long</i>
													<i>Ca Mau</i>

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Made a Proposal to Authorities (%)	d302a1	0%	100%	23.36%	25.96%	24.32%	26.04%	23.91%	28.16%	Minimum Median Maximum	9.95% 29.67% 53.29%	Binh Duong Yen Bai Quang Tri
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Proposal Successful (%)	d302a2	0%	100%	87.28%	87.28%	87.73%	89.97%	87.68%	92.25%	Minimum Median Maximum	49.68% 91.20% 99.53%	Dak Lak An Giang Quang Tri
S2. People's Inspection Boards	Village Has a PIB (%)	d303	0%	100%	33.84%	33.18%	36.56%	35.72%	32.53%	38.92%	Minimum Median Maximum	13.27% 37.55% 68.02%	Dong Nai Son La Thai Binh
S2. People's Inspection Boards	PIB Selected by Vote (%)	d303a	0%	100%	43.54%	42.55%	45.93%	43.91%	40.55%	47.26%	Minimum Median Maximum	10.89% 41.48% 71.74%	Ninh Thuan Ca Mau Vinh Long
S2. People's Inspection Boards	PIB Effective (%)	d303c	0%	100%	78.70%	78.64%	82.90%	80.58%	77.46%	83.71%	Minimum Median Maximum	35.60% 78.60% 97.61%	Cao Bang Bac Lieu Quang Binh
S3. Community Investment Supervision Boards	Commune Has a CISB (%)	d304	0%	100%	14.48%	16.69%	17.16%	19.01%	17.29%	20.74%	Minimum Median Maximum	4.20% 19.04% 41.22%	Soc Trang HCMC Quang Tri
S3. Community Investment Supervision Boards	CISB Effective (%)	d304b	0%	100%	81.65%	83.23%	86.06%	87.12%	84.12%	90.12%	Minimum Median Maximum	37.46% 87.11% 100%	Yen Bai Tuyen Quang Kien Giang

Note: (\*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum. For data in the 2014 PAPI and later iterations, national weights rather than provincial weights are used in generating national level statistics.

**Figure 3.3b: Change in Performance in Vertical Accountability (% - 2014 against 2011)**



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2014 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant

## Interactions with Local Authorities

This sub-dimension measures local governments' accountability when citizens engage local governments to express concerns of a personal or community nature and seek solutions to these concerns. This engagement can be in the form of ad hoc inquiries to village heads, periodical meetings with local government officials and/or voter meetings with National Assembly delegates and/or People's Council members.

As Table 3.3 depicts, the 2014 findings in this sub-dimension reveal irregular interactions between local authorities and citizens. At the national level, only 17% of respondents contacted their village heads and only 12% contacted commune officials. These proportions have been almost constant over the past four years, with some declines in 2013. On interactions with village heads, in Da Nang 52% of respondents contacted their village heads in 2014, as opposed to almost none in Hung Yen. Commune interactions took place most often in Vinh Phuc (with 29% of respondents reporting they had met with commune officials). Meanwhile, in Hung Yen barely anyone reported they had met with their grassroots government officials.

Despite the irregularity of such interactions, of those who counted on either village heads or commune officials in making their concerns heard most rated such meetings effective. At the national level, about 85% appreciated having met with village heads and 80% found meetings with commune officials effective. In both cases, almost everyone in Ca Mau found the interactions useful. Hung Yen and Hai Duong performed poorly, with only around 3% of respondents finding the interaction helpful.

To assess how accountable and open local governments are to citizens, this sub-dimension also includes an indicator on the frequency and effectiveness of citizen proposals to local governments. Since 2011, the proportion of citizens making suggestions to local governments has

hovered around 25%, of whom 90% said their suggestions were acknowledged. Quang Tri was home to the highest number of respondents who have submitted a proposal to their local governments, with 53%, of whom 99.5% said they had received a response to their suggestion. In Binh Duong only 10% of respondents ventured into making suggestions, and in Dak Lak only half of those submitting suggestions said they received a response.

## People's Inspection Boards

This sub-dimension measures the coverage and effectiveness of PIBs, a grassroots and people-elected mechanism to keep local public officials accountable to citizens. In theory, PIBs should be established in all communes and work effectively given they are formed under GRDO-driven democratic voting mechanisms.

What is found in this sub-dimension in 2014 reveals a mixed picture in terms of PIBs being rated effective by citizens, who according to the law establish these boards. At the aggregate level, findings for this sub-dimension show a national mean of only 1.94 points on a scale of 0.33-3.33, lower than the 2013 score of 1.97 and only marginally higher than the baseline score of 1.85 in 2011 (see Table 3.3). Quang Binh is the best performer with a score of 2.36 points, lower than last year's top score of 2.69. Hai Phong remains the poorest performer in this sub-dimension, with a score of only 1.33.

On the existence of PIBs, only 36% of respondents said there is a PIB in their locality, almost no change over the past four years. Among those who were aware of the existence of PIBs in their locality, only 44% correctly said that they are established by citizen votes.

At the provincial level, Thai Binh is again the top performer with 68% reporting the existence of PIBs in their commune. The proportion in Dong Nai is only 13%. In Vinh

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*The 2014 findings reveal irregular interactions between local authorities and citizens.*

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*On the existence of People's Inspection Boards (PIBs), only 36% of respondents said there is a PIB in their locality, almost no change over the past four years.*

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Long 72% knew the correct voting mechanism, while in Ninh Thuan only 11% did so.

Of the small number of respondents who reported the existence of PIBs, about 81% noted that the PIBs work effectively, a little higher than the 78.7% in 2011. In Quang Binh, 97.6% talked positively about the work of PIBs, while only 35.6% did so in Cao Bang.

### Community Investment Supervision Boards

*Across the country, just 19% of respondents said CISBs exist in their localities.*

Using the same approach as the previous sub-dimension, CISB findings are constructed from two indicators encompassing the coverage and effectiveness of CISBs. As noted earlier, this sub-dimension has seen positive development over the years, with a 9% point increase compared to 2011. Nonetheless, the national mean of 1.94 points remains modest on a 0.33-3.33 scale (see Table 3.3).

The key reason for this modest score is the poor coverage of CISBs, as reported in citizen assessments. Across the country, just 19% of respondents said CISBs exist in their localities, a slight increase from 14.5% in 2011. One possible explanation is that PIBs in many communes perform the tasks of CISBs<sup>19</sup>. Quang Tri seems to see more CISBs established as 41% of respondents confirmed the existence of these boards, as opposed to only 4% in Soc Trang.


Among those who noted the existence of CISBs, about 87% said the boards work effectively, a little more than the 82% in 2011. This proportion is 100% in Kien Giang but only 37% in Yen Bai. However, this indicator should be treated with caution as some provinces had a limited number of respondents.

In summary, there has been insignificant improvement in provincial performance in the vertical accountability dimension when comparing the findings over time. More improvement is seen in the coverage and effectiveness of CISBs and in the frequency and usefulness of interactions between local governments and citizens than in the coverage and effectiveness of PIBs. Since the outset of the grassroots democracy regulations in 1997, CISBs and PIBs have been supposed to act as citizen monitoring mechanisms to enhance vertical accountability towards citizens at the grassroots level. However, with such a modest citizen recognition of both the existence and effectiveness of these boards, it is time to review their performance and consider alternative ways to make them work and be felt more by citizens. A suggestion would be to involve non-governmental organisations that may have better capacity and resources in coaching and working together with the boards.

In tandem with the two monitoring mechanisms, local authorities should interact more with citizens through regular and ad-hoc direct meetings to make them more accountable to their citizens. Also, to encourage citizens to make proposals to improve local affairs, local authorities can adopt innovative ways like e-mailboxes on local government portals or messages to public mobile hotlines. More importantly, it is local officials providing timely responses to citizen concerns and requests that will make the difference.

<sup>19</sup> See Bui Phuong Dinh et al (2013) for assessments of provincial performance in PIBs and CISBs in different provinces (available at [www.papi.vn](http://www.papi.vn))

Map 3.4: Provincial Performance in Control of Corruption by Quartiles Over Time



## DIMENSION 4: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

This section presents findings on citizen experiences with local government performance in controlling corruption (Dimension 4). Dimension 4 is comprised of four sub-dimensions: 'limits on public sector corruption', 'limits on corruption in public service delivery', 'equity in state employment' and 'willingness to fight corruption'. Where appropriate, the 2014 findings will be compared with those from previous surveys to show changes in provincial performance over time.

*Over the past four years, central and southern provinces have tended to do better in anti-corruption efforts than northern provinces.*


Strong regional patterns are seen in the 2014 findings, similar to what was observed in the previous three national PAPI iterations. Map 3.4 shows that central and southern provinces have tended to do better in anti-corruption efforts than northern provinces. The 2014 findings show that as many as 12 of the best performers in this dimension are central and southern provinces. Most notably, for four years in a row the southern provinces of Soc Trang, Long An, Tien Giang and Binh Duong and the central province of Binh Dinh have consistently been in the top performing group. Vinh Long, another southern province, has maintained its top performing status for three years in a row since 2012. The central and southern provinces Dong Nai and Kon Tum, however, are among the poorest performers for three years in a row, and Ha Noi and Hai Phong have consistently been in the list of poorest performers for the past four years.

Figure 3.4a reveals large variations in 2014 between the eight regions in terms of provincial performance of control of corruption. The Mekong region stands out in this dimension as provincial scores range from 5.92 to 7.28 points, while the national mean is 6.11 points. The confidence intervals in most of the provinces in this

region (except for Hau Giang and Bac Lieu) are narrow, meaning that citizens in these provinces tend to agree that overall their provinces did well in controlling corruption. The largest contribution to higher provincial scores in the region is better equity in state employment in each of the provinces, as compared to others across the country. The second best performer is the Southeast region, which is also a key economic zone. In contrast, provinces from the Northwest, the Red River Delta and the Central Highlands regions score lower, and the largest attribution here is poorer equity in state employment. In provinces with larger confidence intervals, like Dien Bien, Vinh Phuc, Nam Dinh and Quang Ngai, citizen experiences and perceptions differ a lot, meaning that there is wide variance in the perceptions of local governments' willingness to fight corruption.

Among the five centrally governed municipalities, Ho Chi Minh City performs better than Ha Noi, and Can Tho and Da Nang do much better than Hai Phong. Hai Phong's mean score of 4.9 points lies between the two bounds of the 95% confidence intervals for this dimension, and is the lowest among the five municipalities as well as of the country as a whole (see Figure 3.4a). One reason for the low score in Hai Phong is that citizens there rated the municipality very low in control of corruption in the public sector, especially in administrative services for construction permits (see Table 3.4).

Figure 3.4a: Control of Corruption in the Public Sector (Dimension 4) by Region



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*When compared with the 2011 baseline, improvement in provincial control of corruption has slowed over the past four years.*

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Table 3.4 presents the 12 key indicators used to construct the four sub-dimensions constituting Dimension 4. Each indicator looks at citizen evaluation of actions undertaken by local governments to address specific types of corruption. Table 3.4 shows the trends and changes at the indicator level within the expected minimum and maximum values of each indicator. In addition, it shows how convergent or divergent provinces are when the median value of each indicator is taken into account. For instance, in half of the provinces victims of corruption, in the form of being asked for bribes by either a commune People's Committee official or a commune policeman, would not denunciate those acts, while in the other half of the country this ranges from 0% in several provinces to 84.45% in Phu Yen, a large divergence.

When compared with the 2011 baseline, improvement in provincial control of corruption has slowed over the past four years (see Figure 3.4b)<sup>20</sup>. Although positive increases of more than 5% were noted in 35 provinces in the 2013 survey, fewer provinces (27) experienced that level of positive change in 2014. Cao Bang and Tra Vinh made the biggest jumps in 2014, with their 2014 scores increasing by more than 30% from their 2011 figures. On the contrary, Ba Ria-Vung Tau experienced the largest drop, falling 16.6% from its 2011 benchmark.

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<sup>20</sup> For a comparison, see the 2013 PAPI Report, p. 56


Table 3.4: List of Indicators on Control of Corruption (Dimension 4)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
<b>Total Dimension</b>	<b>Dimension 4: Control of Corruption</b>		1	10	5.76	5.90	6.15	6.11	5.99	6.23	Minimum Median Maximum	4.85 6.16 7.29	Dien Bien Thanh Hoa Ca Mau
Sub-Dimension 1	Limits on Public Sector Corruption		0.25	2.5	1.40	1.44	1.56	1.53	1.48	1.58	Minimum Median Maximum	1.01 1.57 1.99	Hai Phong Dak Lak Ca Mau
Sub-Dimension 2	Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery		0.25	2.5	1.76	1.75	1.83	1.81	1.78	1.84	Minimum Median Maximum	1.51 1.81 2.10	Dien Bien Son La Binh Duong
Sub-Dimension 3	Equity in Employment		0.25	2.5	0.94	0.96	1.02	0.99	0.95	1.03	Minimum Median Maximum	0.58 0.94 1.49	Yen Bai BRVT Binh Duong
Sub-Dimension 4	Willingness to Fight Corruption		0.25	2.5	1.66	1.75	1.74	1.78	1.76	1.80	Minimum Median Maximum	1.48 1.80 2.07	Phu Yen Quang Nam Da Nang
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Diverting of Public Funds (% agree)	d402a	0%	100%	52.06%	52.70%	59.87%	58.82%	55.86%	61.79%	Minimum Median Maximum	31.71% 60.29% 76.19%	Hai Duong Tuyen Quang Binh Dinh
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Bribes for Land Title (% agree)	d402b	0%	100%	49.74%	51.27%	55.40%	53.82%	50.92%	56.73%	Minimum Median Maximum	28.57% 53.45% 79.81%	Cao Bang Dak Lak Ca Mau
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Kickbacks for Construction Permit (% agree)	d402e	0%	100%	51.19%	54.10%	59.06%	57.81%	55.56%	60.06%	Minimum Median Maximum	22.55% 59.81% 81.00%	Hai Phong Hai Duong Ninh Binh

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	No Bribes at Public District Hospital (% agree)	d402c	0%	100%	46.52%	45.65%	51.10%	51.15%	48.44%	53.85%	Minimum Median Maximum	22.68% 48.73% 74.86%	Thai Nguyen Kien Giang Binh Duong
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	No Bribes for Teachers' Favouritism (% agree)	d402d	0%	100%	59.14%	59.00%	63.07%	60.16%	57.94%	62.38%	Minimum Median Maximum	40.32% 62.04% 80.07%	Dien Bien Tra Vinh Quang Binh
S3. Equity in State Employment	No Bribes for State Employment (% agree)	d402f	0%	100%	40.33%	39.07%	42.86%	41.61%	38.90%	44.33%	Minimum Median Maximum	12.38% 36.50% 75.78%	Thai Nguyen Cao Bang Vinh Long
S3. Equity in State Employment	No Relationship for State Employment	d403a- d403e	0	5	1.06	1.20	1.27	1.20	1.12	1.29	Minimum Median Maximum	0.37 1.14 2.28	Ha Giang Binh Phuoc Binh Duong
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Corruption Had no Effect on Respondent (%)	d405a	0%	100%	95.39%	96.00%	96.49%	96.64%	95.69%	97.59%	Minimum Median Maximum	87.69% 97.14% 99.97%	Cao Bang Bac Lieu Vinh Long
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Know Anti-Corruption Law (%)	d406	0%	100%	42.45%	44.11%	40.09%	42.69%	40.23%	45.15%	Minimum Median Maximum	15.73% 44.14% 81.73%	Lai Chau An Giang Da Nang
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Province Serious about Combating Corruption (%)	d407	0%	100%	34.00%	34.60%	38.10%	39.74%	37.74%	41.75%	Minimum Median Maximum	14.58% 38.52% 61.25%	Tra Vinh Hoa Binh Ca Mau
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Denunciation Price '000s VND (Imputed)	d404	0		5,523	5,111	8,176	8,892	8,190	9,594	Minimum Median Maximum	3,039 9,011 16,827	Hau Giang Hung Yen Lao Cai
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Victims Denunciate Bribe Request (%)	d405a	100%	0%	9.15%	7.01%	2.95%	2.96%	-0.05%	5.97%	Minimum Median Maximum	0% 0% 84.45%	Multiple Multiple Phu Yen

Note: (\*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum. For data in the 2014 PAPI and later iterations, national weights rather than provincial weights are used in generating national level statistics.

Figure 3.4b: Change in Performance in Control of Corruption (% - 2014 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2014 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant


### Limits on Public Sector Corruption

This sub-dimension is constructed from three indicators, including: (i) no diversion of public funds by officials, (ii) no bribes for land titles, and (iii) no kickback for construction permits. Citizens answer these questions by reflecting on whether they witness or experience such forms of corrupt practices in everyday interactions.

As shown in Table 3.4, in this sub-dimension the national mean score is 1.53, slightly lower than in 2013. The southernmost province of Ca Mau excels by posting the highest score of 1.99 points (out of 2.5) in 2014. This means Ca Mau’s citizens appreciate their leaders’ efforts to stamp out corruption by public officials and civil servants. Meanwhile, Hai Phong scores the lowest at 1.01 points, a slight increase compared to the 2013 minimum score in this sub-dimension.

**Figure 3.4c: Perception of Corruption**

(Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect = 100% agreement)



Findings from the three indicators show that compared to 2013, fewer citizens agree that public officials would not divert public funds for private use, ask for bribes when handling LURCs for citizens or ask for kickbacks when handling construction permits for citizens (see Table 3.4 regarding indicators under sub-dimension 1). Figure 3.4c reveals a clearer picture of these indicators by province. The branches of the star represent the percentage of people who

agree that the corresponding statements in the legend are true. Similar to what was found in the previous three surveys, no province is close to the perfect star graph displayed in the bottom-right corner. Central and southern provinces seem to be better at mitigating corruption in the public sector. Among the top 10 performers, Binh Dinh and Quang Nam are central provinces while the rest are southern.

## Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery

This sub-dimension measures the level of corruption perceived and experienced by citizens when using public health care and primary schools. The two indicators used for this sub-dimension include (i) no bribes at public district hospitals and (ii) no bribes for teachers' favouritism at public primary schools.

As shown in Table 3.4, the national mean score for this sub-dimension is 1.81 on a scale of 0.25 to 2.5 points. Binh Duong tops the list with a score of 2.1 points, while Dien Bien scores lowest with 1.51 points.

No province comes close to the perfect score regarding citizens' perception of bribery in public education and health care (see Figure 3.4c). The top performer in the indicator 'no bribe at public district hospital' is Binh Duong, where 74.86% of respondents deny that users have to pay bribes when accessing health care at district hospitals. On the other hand, half of the provinces fall between the range of 48.73% and 22.68% denials, implying that bribery in public district hospitals is still prevalent. Regarding bribery at public primary schools, Quang Binh appears to have the best control over the problem, with 80.07% of respondents denying it occurs. However, in half of the country only between 12.38% and 36.5% of respondents deny it takes place, meaning that addressing bribery at public primary schools remains a challenge for almost every province.

## Equity in State Employment

This sub-dimension includes perception-based queries about citizens' views of equity in public sector employment. It is composed

of two indicators, 'no bribes for state employment' and 'public sector jobs that do not require connections' (i.e. nepotism).

Equity in public employment remains difficult to achieve although public sector reforms have been carried out in Viet Nam for nearly two decades. As PAPI findings have shown over time (see Table 3.4), the national mean value for this sub-dimension has always been around 1 point, lower than an average value of the score ranging between 0.25 and 2.5 points. Binh Duong tops this sub-dimension in 2014 with its score of 1.49, as respondents there saw more equity in state employment than in any other province. Yen Bai scores the lowest at only 0.58.

Informal payments for state employment and personal relationships still play an important role for those who wish to pursue public sector careers. This observation has been confirmed by each of the PAPI surveys over the past four years and underlines the systemic nature of nepotism in public sector employment, even at the lowest levels of government. In Vinh Long, 75.78% of respondents perceived that they do not need to pay a bribe for state employment in the province, while in Thai Nguyen only 12.38% of respondents share the same view. In Binh Duong, citizens see no need for a relationship when applying for state employment in at least two out of five posts queried – a big contrast to what is found in Ha Giang where none of five posts are free from nepotism.

Also, the prevalence of nepotism is evident in the small variance across provinces and in the star graphs presented in Figure 3.4d. Provinces such as Binh Duong, Quang Tri and Thai Binh seem to perform better in ensuring equity in public employment, despite the large gaps between their performance scores and the expected perfect scores.

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*Addressing bribery at public primary schools remains a challenge for almost every province.*

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*Informal payments for state employment and personal relationships still play an important role for those who wish to pursue public sector careers.*

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**Figure 3.4d: Levels of Nepotism at the Provincial Level**

(Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing personal connections are important; Perfect = 100% disagreement)



**Willingness to Fight Corruption**

This sub-dimension measures government efforts to combat corruption and engage citizens to fight corruption in their jurisdictions. It is comprised of knowledge-based and experience-based indicators (see Table 3.4 for details of the indicators).

Awareness of the Anti-Corruption Law has not increased over time, and still only about 40% of respondents nationwide know about it. This level of awareness is higher than that of the GRDO as reported in Dimension 1 ‘Participation at Local Levels’ (see Table 3.1). By the letter of the law (Article 279 of the 2009 Penal Code), taking a bribe worth 2 million VND can be subject to criminalisation. However, as the results show, there is a very low proportion (2.96%) of victims of bribery

requests who denunciate these corrupt acts. Moreover, on the tolerance of bribe requests from commune-level public officials or police, the national mean monetary amount that would trigger denunciation of such requests increased to 8.89 million VND in 2014, up from 5.52 million VND in 2011. Citizens in Lao Cai tend to tolerate such requests the most, as respondents on average said they would only report bribe requests when these reached 16.82 million VND, compared to the 3.04 million VND on average tolerated by Hau Giang respondents.

The trend in the willingness of provincial leaders to fight corruption did not change in 2014. Across the country, only 39.74% of respondents agreed that their provincial leaders were serious about combating corruption. Citizens attributed their high

*Across the country, only 39.74% of respondents agreed that their provincial leaders were serious about combating corruption.*

level of tolerance of corruption to four factors: 1) their belief that denunciations would be ineffective (56.33% of those that experienced bribery payments); 2) the complaint procedures were too burdensome (9%); 3) they were scared of retaliation (7.72%); and 4) they did not know how to pursue a denunciation (7.3%).

In summary, efforts to control corruption at the provincial level have had limited effect, as reflected in the 2014 PAPI findings for this dimension. Citizens across the country still witness prevalent nepotism in state employment, bribery in the public sector and the lack of willingness to fight corruption from both sides of the transaction (i.e. the local government and citizens themselves).


The regional pattern shows that citizens in south central and southern provinces tend to perceive and experience that their local authorities perform better in mitigating corrupt acts in the public sector than most of the provinces in other regions. What poorer performing provinces can learn from better performing ones may include ensuring better equity in state employment, less bribery for public services and fewer incidences of public officials making use of their power to earn informal payments from state fund diversion, provision of public administrative services and state recruitment. A stronger willingness from citizens to report corrupt acts is also important.

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*Citizens across the country still witness prevalent nepotism in state employment, bribery in the public sector and the lack of willingness to fight corruption from both sides of the transaction (i.e. the local government and citizens themselves).*

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Map 3.5: Provincial Performance on Public Administrative Procedures by Quartiles Over Time



## DIMENSION 5: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

This dimension examines the quality of public administrative services in areas important to citizens and encompasses certification services and application procedures for construction permits, LURCs and personal documents. The four indicators used to construct this dimension help reveal the true performance of local government agencies measured against six elements constituting a professional and responsive administrative service, including convenience, security, reliability, personal attention, fairness and accountability. Factors that affect citizens' satisfaction with the four administrative services are also identified.

Map 3.5 presents the four quartiles of provincial performance in delivering public administrative services to citizens over the course of four years. It depicts no discernible regional patterns over time. It does, however, reveal consistent performance in a number of provinces. For instance, the northern province of Nam Dinh and the three central provinces of Ha Tinh, Quang Binh and Da Nang have successfully maintained their status as the best performers for four years in a row. Vinh Phuc, Long An and Binh Thuan are in the best performing group for two years in a row (since 2013). In contrast, the northern province of Quang Ninh and the southern Soc Trang province have remained in the poorest performing group over the past four years. The north-western mountainous province of Lai Chau and the Red River Delta province of Hung Yen have maintained their poor performing status for three years in a row.

As depicted in Chapter 1, this dimension has displayed little improvement in citizens' satisfaction with public administrative services and low variance across provinces in terms of local governments' performance in delivering these services. Figure 3.5a confirms these trends by showing that

provincial scores range between 6.4 to 7.6 points within narrow confidence intervals and that regional patterns are not noticeable (see also Table 3.5). When the 95% confidence intervals are taken into account, the better performers do not necessarily outperform the poorer performers in this dimension. When taking absolute scores into account, Quang Tri tops the sub-dimension on certification procedures, Ninh Binh on construction permits, Kien Giang on LURC procedures and Da Nang on commune-level one-stop shops for personal procedures.

Figure 3.5a shows some larger variance within the Northeast region and between centrally governed municipalities. Among the five municipalities, Da Nang stands out with higher citizen satisfaction with all four measured services and with a very narrow confidence interval. Public administrative services for LURCs and commune one-stop shops for personal procedures tend to work better and more evenly in the Mekong region.

The convergence of provinces around the mean score is also reflected in the decreasing growth in annual provincial performance when compared to the 2011 benchmarks. As Figure 3.5b indicates, significant changes of 5% are noted in fewer provinces than in 2013<sup>21</sup>. In 2013, 19 provinces experienced more than a 5% point rise from 2011. However, this number drops to only six provinces in 2014.

Of the four sub-dimensions, the public administrative service for LURCs does not seem to gain citizen satisfaction at either the national or provincial level. On a scale of 0.25 to 2.5 points, the national 2014 mean score for the sub-dimension on land procedures is the lowest of the four at the national level and is declining at the provincial level.

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*This dimension has displayed little improvement in citizens' satisfaction with public administrative services.*

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<sup>21</sup> See the 2013 PAPI Report, p. 65

Figure 3.5a: Public Administrative Procedures (Dimension 5) by Region





Table 3.5: List of Indicators on Public Administrative Procedures (Dimension 5)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
<b>Total Dimension</b>	<b>Dimension 5: Public Administrative Procedures</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6.88</b>	<b>6.87</b>	<b>6.89</b>	<b>6.88</b>	<b>6.83</b>	<b>6.92</b>	<b>Minimum Median Maximum</b>	<b>6.40 6.85 7.61</b>	<b>Quang Ninh BRVT Da Nang</b>
<i>Sub-Dimension 1</i>	<i>Certification Procedures</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.68</i>	<i>1.67</i>	<i>1.69</i>	<i>1.71</i>	<i>1.68</i>	<i>1.74</i>	<i>Minimum Median Maximum</i>	<i>1.32 1.70 2.01</i>	<i>Quang Nam Ben Tre Quang Tri</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 2</i>	<i>Construction Permits</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.77</i>	<i>1.77</i>	<i>1.76</i>	<i>1.75</i>	<i>1.75</i>	<i>1.76</i>	<i>Minimum Median Maximum</i>	<i>1.51 1.76 1.94</i>	<i>Ben Tre Hai Duong Ninh Binh</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 3</i>	<i>Land Procedures</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.58</i>	<i>1.57</i>	<i>1.58</i>	<i>1.55</i>	<i>1.54</i>	<i>1.56</i>	<i>Minimum Median Maximum</i>	<i>1.28 1.56 1.78</i>	<i>Thai Binh Hai Duong Kien Giang</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 4</i>	<i>Personal Procedures</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.84</i>	<i>1.86</i>	<i>1.85</i>	<i>1.86</i>	<i>1.84</i>	<i>1.88</i>	<i>Minimum Median Maximum</i>	<i>1.70 1.87 2.03</i>	<i>Ha Giang Kien Giang Da Nang</i>
S1. Certification Procedures	Applied for Certification Service (%)	d501	Min	Max	38.82%	37.52%	37.11%	39.00%	36.32%	41.68%	Minimum Median Maximum	13.64% 38.35% 67.67%	Quang Nam Ninh Thuan Quang Tri
S1. Certification Procedures	Total Quality of Certification Procedures (8 criteria)	d503a-e, d503g-i	0	8	7.10	7.14	7.34	7.30	7.17	7.44	Minimum Median Maximum	5.18 7.32 7.83	Ca Mau Ha Tinh Ha Nam
S2. Construction Permits	Applied for Construction Permit (%)	d505	Min	Max	4.89%	4.38%	3.45%	4.11%	3.42%	4.79%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.11% 4.00% 11.16%	Thai Binh Ha Tinh Ha Giang
S2. Construction Permits	Did not Use Many Windows for Construction Permit (%)	d505d	0%	100%	92.86%	87.58%	94.63%	88.02%	82.09%	93.96%	Minimum Median Maximum	52.19% 95.93% 100%	Thai Binh BRVT Multiple
S2. Construction Permits	Received Construction Permit (%)	d505e	0%	100%	91.96%	92.70%	92.10%	94.16%	91.78%	96.54%	Minimum Median Maximum	45.41% 99.58% 100%	Ha Nam Thanh Hoa Multiple

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S2. Construction Permits	Total Quality of Construction Procedures (8 criteria)	d505fa-fe, d505fg-fi	0	8	6.82	6.55	6.70	6.66	6.27	7.04	Minimum Median Maximum	2.97 6.83 8.00	Son La Bac Kan Lang Son
S3. Land Procedures	Took Part in Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures (%)	d507	0%	100%	10.64%	8.38%	8.75%	7.97%	6.71%	9.24%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.51% 6.71% 22.78%	Quang Ngai Dak Lak Thai Nguyen
S3. Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures	Received Land Title (%)	d507g	0%	100%	82.48%	80.74%	75.85%	75.36%	68.34%	82.38%	Minimum Median Maximum	2.54% 78.90% 100%	Thai Binh Kon Tum Kien Giang
S3. Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures	Total Quality of Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures (8 criteria)	d507ha-hh	0	8	5.05	4.87	5.09	5.04	4.58	5.50	Minimum Median Maximum	0.37 4.77 7.32	Thai Binh Hai Phong Lai Chau
S4. Personal Procedures	Took Part in Personal Administrative Procedures (%)	d508a-d508k	Min	Max	33.04%	33.15%	31.50%	34.87%	32.97%	36.78%	Minimum Median Maximum	17.61% 35.77% 64.20%	Hai Duong Phu Yen Cao Bang
S4. Personal Procedures	Total Quality of Personal Procedures (8 criteria)	d508d1a-d1e, d508d1g-d1i	0	8	6.79	6.91	6.92	6.75	6.59	6.92	Minimum Median Maximum	3.48 6.89 7.77	Lai Chau Hai Phong Da Nang
S4. Personal Procedures	Did not Use Many Windows for Personal Procedures (%)	d508c1	0%	100%	93.14%	94.57%	93.03%	92.68%	90.38%	94.98%	Minimum Median Maximum	74.39% 93.40% 100%	Binh Duong Soc Trang Quang Ninh

Note: (\*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum. For data in the 2014 PAPI and later iterations, national weights rather than provincial weights are used in generating national level statistics.

**Figure 3.5b: Changes in Performance in Public Administrative Procedures (% - 2014 against 2011)**



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2014 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant

### Public Certification Services

This sub-dimension measures provincial performance in providing certification services to citizens at district and commune levels. PAPI asks service users about the clarity of application procedures, publicity of application fees, behaviour and competence of civil servants, paperwork loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results and their overall service satisfaction levels.

In 2014, 39% of respondents across the country used the certification services at their commune People’s Committee, district

justice office or other public office. The level of citizen satisfaction was the highest of all four administrative services being measured (with a national mean score of 7.3 points, about the same as previous years). Similar to findings in previous PAPI iterations, most users (93.2%) accessed the service at commune-level People’s Committees, while only 4.2% approached district-level justice offices. Ha Nam’s certification services seem to receive the largest citizen satisfaction, as it scores 7.83 on the total quality of certification services, while Ca Mau lags behind with the lowest score of 5.18.

**Figure 3.5c: Assessment of Quality of Certification Services**  
 (Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect = 100% agreement)




Figure 3.5c shows the levels of respondents' agreement with statements about the quality of certification services. This indicator is scaled between 0 and 8, with 8 representing the sample maximum score aggregated from the eight criteria. On the whole, respondents remain satisfied with certification services in three fourth of the provinces, except Ca Mau, Ha Giang, Kien Giang, Vinh Phuc, Dien Bien and Soc Trang, to name a few.

### Application Procedures for Construction Permits

With this sub-dimension, PAPI measures the quality of services granting construction permits to civil construction projects, such as building, expanding or remodelling houses in anything more than a basic way. It also looks at the clarity of application procedures, the publicity of application fees, the behaviour and competence of civil servants, paperwork loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results and overall service satisfaction levels.

The number of applicants for construction permits in 2014 remains very small, at 4.11% of the total population, a little higher than in 2013<sup>22</sup>. Of the few construction permit applicants at a national level, 94.16% said they received their permits and 88.02% said they did not have to deviate from the accepted procedure to get paperwork processed - a little lower than in 2013.

Half of all province respondents reported they did not have to go to different public officials to get their applications for construction permits processed, with nearly all of these applicants sharing this positive experience. In Thai Binh, however, only half of the applicants had positive feedback about their experience.

In 2014, the quality of services granting citizens construction permits remains stable, with an average national-level score of 6.66 on a scale of 0-8 points, about the same as findings from previous PAPI iterations. Lang Son applicants enjoyed a good service, while those in Son La were relatively unhappy (see Table 3.5).

The star graphs in Figure 3.5d highlight respondents' levels of agreement with given statements examining the quality of service. The graphs only show findings for provinces where there were more than 15 applicants for construction permits in 2014 and depict significant provincial variations. Although closer to the perfect score, Quang Binh still needs to improve transparency in application fees. For Thai Nguyen, the service can be improved if application fees are publicly displayed, when users are informed about deadlines for receipt of the permits and when they receive the results as scheduled.


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*Of the few construction permit applicants at a national level, 94.16% said they received their permits and 88.02% said they did not have to deviate from the accepted procedure to get paperwork processed.*

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<sup>22</sup> Caution is advisable when using these numbers due to the reported small number of applicants for construction permits in each province.

**Figure 3.5d: Assessment of Construction Permit Application Procedures**  
(Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect = 100% agreement)



### Application Procedures for Land Use Rights Certificates

PAPI measures provincial performance in the provision of LURCs for citizens and the quality of LURC-related administrative services. It covers application procedures for new LURCs, LURC renewals and transferring of LURCs at provincial, district and commune levels. Similar to other batteries on administrative procedures, LURC indicators include questions about the proportion of people that submit applications for LURCs, availability of the one-stop shop service, clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour and competence of civil servants, deadlines and timeliness of results, as well as overall service satisfaction.

In 2014, only 7.97% of nationwide respondents said their households had their LURCs (including new LURCs, renewed LURCs and transfer of LURCs) processed, similar to the findings from previous PAPI iterations. Of the households that applied for LURCs, about 80% did not have to visit multiple offices or 'windows' to have their paperwork processed. None of the applicants in Binh Dinh had to go to more than one shop, while in Da Nang only 11% of applicants had that positive experience. About 75.36% of the applicants nationwide received their LURCs, and all applicants in Kien Giang in 2014 received their LURCs.

Yet, 9.6% of applicants nationwide had their paperwork processed with solicitation from 'intermediaries' rather than being fully

supported at the relevant one-stop shops. More than half (about 58%) of applicants received their final results within 30 days after lodging an application – the duration specified by law<sup>23</sup>. However, as many as 34.2% of applicants had to wait 100 days to get their paperwork, and 7.8% had to wait from 100 days up to 720 days for the final results.


On the total quality of LURC application processes (see Table 3.5), there is a remarkable difference across provinces. The national mean is 5.04 on a scale of 0-8 points, and the difference between the best performer (Lai Chau, with a score of 7.32)

and the poorest performer (Thai Binh, with a score of 0.37) is large.

The star graphs in Figure 3.5e present provinces where more than 15 applicants responded on any of the three types of procedures queried. The poorest 10 performers within the eight criteria are diverse in terms of geographical locations. Thanh Hoa lost its 2013 momentum and fell behind many others. Long An can do better in terms of publicity of application fees, deadlines met and less paperwork. Ha Noi should improve in all eight indicators in order to catch up with Ho Chi Minh City.

*As many as 34.2% of applicants had to wait 100 days to get their paperwork, and 7.8% had to wait from 100 days up to 720 days for the final results.*

**Figure 3.5e: Assessment of Land Use Rights Certificate Application Procedures**  
(Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect = 100%)



### Application Procedures for Personal Documents at Commune Level

This sub-dimension measures the performance of commune-level People’s Committees in

addressing applications for different types of personal documents. It covers administrative procedures such as birth and marriage certificates, death notifications, ethnicity-related procedures, residency registrations, housing and employment subsidies<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> Article 61, Decree No 43/2014/NĐ-CP on handling of administrative procedures for land-use rights


<sup>24</sup> These types of personal papers were selected based on the list of administrative procedures that commune-level People’s Committees are delegated to process for citizens.

In 2014, about 35% of respondents used the one-stop shop services at the commune level to have their personal documents processed. Of these, 92.6% had a good experience with the service. In Quang Ninh all applicants were satisfied, while in Binh Duong (the province with the lowest percentage), as many as 74.4% of the applicants had the same good experience.

satisfaction, as the national mean score of this indicator posts 6.75 points. Nonetheless, when looking deeper into each province's performance, there remains a significant difference between the best performer (Da Nang, with a score of 7.77) and the poorest performer (Lai Chau, with a score of only 3.48). Figure 3.5g reveals that the lack of transparency in application fees is the main reason for the lower scores in Tuyen Quang, Binh Dinh and Hung Yen.

On the total quality, one-stop shops at the commune level gained relatively high user

**Figure 3.5g: Assessment of Commune-level Administrative Procedures**  
(Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect = 100%)



In summary, despite the higher score of Dimension 5 compared to the first four governance dimensions, this dimension does see stagnancy in the performance of local government agencies in providing professional and responsive administrative services. This dimension also shows the uneven quality of four public administrative services (certification procedures, construction permits, LURCs and commune-level administrative services for personal documents). Certification services perform much better than LURC services.

Challenges facing provincial governments in improving citizen satisfaction with these public administrative services include ensuring more


transparency in application fees, responding by deadlines, and, more significantly, ensuring better behaviour and competence of civil servants providing the services. Measures to increase citizen satisfaction with public administrative services may include relevant local government agencies displaying fees and charges at one-stop shops and notifying applicants of changes in deadlines. More importantly, as PAPI findings over time have confirmed, citizens are demanding that civil servants improve their soft skills, in particular interpersonal communication with clients and their professional competence in processing the administrative services.

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*Citizens are demanding that civil servants improve their soft skills, in particular interpersonal communication with clients and their professional competence in processing the administrative services.*

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Map 3.6: Provincial Performance in Public Service Delivery by Quartiles Over Time



## DIMENSION 6: PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

This last dimension examines the quality of 'Public Service Delivery' through four key public services: public health care, public primary education, basic infrastructure and residential law and order. Similar to previous PAPI surveys, citizens were asked about their direct experience with the accessibility, quality and availability of basic public services in their communes/wards, districts and provinces. In particular, they were asked how responsive local authorities are to the basic needs and demands of citizens, with the usage and efficiency of public investment in these areas of special interest.

As Map 3.6 depicts, regional patterns emerge with positive signs in the south central and southern provinces over the course of the four years since 2011. Also, low land provinces tend to perform better than their mountainous and Central Highlands peers. For four consecutive years, Hai Phong, Quang Binh, Thua Thien-Hue, Da Nang, Binh Dinh, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Ho Chi Minh City, Vinh Long and Kien Giang are in the best performing group. At the other end of the scale, Cao Bang, Yen Bai, Gia Lai, Dak Nong, Binh Phuoc, Tay Ninh and Ca Mau remain in the poorest performing group for four years in a row.

Figure 3.6a confirms the highlighted regional patterns. Of the eight geographical regions, even performance between provinces is found in the North Central region. In the Red River Delta, South Central and Mekong River Delta regions, except for the two outstanding municipalities of Hai Phong and Da Nang and the province of Vinh Long, other provinces also show a level of evenness in their public service delivery performance. The most uneven pattern is found in the Southeast region, where at least three provinces (including Binh Duong, Ba Ria-Vung Tau and Ho Chi Minh City) perform

much better than the rest when taking the confidence intervals into account.

Among the centrally governed municipalities, Da Nang, Hai Phong and Ho Chi Minh City maintain their good performance, mostly owing to the more accessible and better quality basic infrastructure (see Figure 3.6a). Primary education in Hai Phong is appreciated more highly by citizens than the status of law and order. In Da Nang, it is the other way around.

Similar to what was found in previous PAPI iterations, the 'basic infrastructure' sub-dimension has the greatest variation across provinces, while 'law and order' is relatively consistent across the country (see Table 3.6). Hai Phong ranks highest in two sub-dimensions ('public education' and 'basic infrastructure'). Meanwhile, Ha Noi, in the same group of centrally governed municipalities, ranks lowest in the sub-dimension 'public health care'. The poorer, more mountainous provinces of Binh Phuoc and Ha Giang need more investment or need to invest more in primary education and basic infrastructure, respectively. Kon Tum needs to beef up its safety for citizens. Table 3.6 presents details about each indicator, its scales as well as the maximum, median or minimum score a province may get by each indicator.

Overall, an increasing number of provinces performed better in public service delivery in 2014 than before. Compared with the 2011 benchmarks in this dimension, 22 provinces saw their mean score increase in 2014 (see Figure 3.6b), while in 2013 only 17 provinces did so. However, the north-western province of Son La seems to have failed to catch up, as the province is the only one to decline by over 9% from its 2011 score.

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*An increasing number of provinces performed better in public service delivery in 2014 than before.*

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Figure 3.6a: Public Services Delivery (Dimension 6) by Region





Table 3.6: List of Indicators on Public Service Delivery (Dimension 6)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
<b>Total Dimension</b>	<b>Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6.75</b>	<b>6.90</b>	<b>6.95</b>	<b>7.02</b>	<b>6.95</b>	<b>7.09</b>	<b>Minimum</b> <b>Median</b> <b>Maximum</b>	<b>6.01</b> <b>6.87</b> <b>7.86</b>	<b>Binh Phuoc</b> <b>Vinh Phuc</b> <b>Vinh Long</b>
<i>Sub-Dimension 1</i>	<i>Public Health</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.75</i>	<i>1.78</i>	<i>1.78</i>	<i>1.80</i>	<i>1.77</i>	<i>1.83</i>	<i>Minimum</i> <i>Median</i> <i>Maximum</i>	<i>1.51</i> <i>1.83</i> <i>2.11</i>	<i>Ha Noi</i> <i>Quang Ninh</i> <i>Quang Nam</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 2</i>	<i>Public Education</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.65</i>	<i>1.67</i>	<i>1.68</i>	<i>1.66</i>	<i>1.64</i>	<i>1.68</i>	<i>Minimum</i> <i>Median</i> <i>Maximum</i>	<i>1.26</i> <i>1.62</i> <i>2.03</i>	<i>Binh Phuoc</i> <i>Lam Dong</i> <i>Hai Phong</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 3</i>	<i>Basic Infrastructure</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.75</i>	<i>1.85</i>	<i>1.86</i>	<i>1.92</i>	<i>1.87</i>	<i>1.97</i>	<i>Minimum</i> <i>Median</i> <i>Maximum</i>	<i>1.30</i> <i>1.81</i> <i>2.46</i>	<i>Ha Giang</i> <i>Thanh Hoa</i> <i>Hai Phong</i>
<i>Sub-Dimension 4</i>	<i>Law and Order</i>		<i>0.25</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.60</i>	<i>1.60</i>	<i>1.62</i>	<i>1.64</i>	<i>1.62</i>	<i>1.65</i>	<i>Minimum</i> <i>Median</i> <i>Maximum</i>	<i>1.52</i> <i>1.64</i> <i>1.77</i>	<i>Kon Tum</i> <i>Da Nang</i> <i>Ca Mau</i>
S1. Public Health	Population with Health Insurance (%)	d601	0%	100%	53.95%	53.00%	54.02%	57.78%	54.17%	61.39%	Minimum Median Maximum	31.11% 61.76% 99.71%	Phu Yen Thai Binh Ha Giang
S1. Public Health	Quality of Health Insurance (4 pt scale)	d601b	0	4	3.30	3.33	3.37	3.40	3.37	3.44	Minimum Median Maximum	2.89 3.40 3.75	Ha Noi Tuyen Quang Hau Giang
S1. Public Health	Quality of Free Medical Care for Children (5 pt scale)	d603c	0	5	3.85	3.92	3.91	4.00	3.94	4.06	Minimum Median Maximum	3.56 3.95 4.54	Ha Noi Kien Giang Tra Vinh
S1. Public Health	Poor Households are Subsidized (%)	d602	0%	100%	72.21%	75.05%	74.16%	76.46%	74.10%	78.82%	Minimum Median Maximum	55.18% 78.06% 98.00%	Binh Phuoc An Giang Yen Bai
S1. Public Health	Checks for Children are Free (%)	d603a	0%	100%	69.55%	73.03%	72.59%	72.71%	68.84%	76.59%	Minimum Median Maximum	39.64% 78.81% 97.63%	Hai Phong Soc Trang Quang Tri
S1. Public Health	Total Hospital Quality (10 criteria)	d604da-d604dk	0	10	5.49	5.57	5.75	5.32	5.05	5.59	Minimum Median Maximum	2.56 5.37 9.35	Ca Mau Ninh Thuan Vinh Long
S2. Public Education	Kilometre Walk to School	d606ca	Min	Max	0.99	0.95	0.95	1.00	0.99	1.02	Minimum Median Maximum	0.5 1.0 1.8	Nam Dinh Phu Yen Binh Phuoc

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean				National PAPI 2014 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S2. Public Education	Number of Minutes Travelling to School	d606cb	Min	Max	10.06	9.71	9.63	8.89	8.62	9.17	Minimum Median Maximum	5 10 15	Vinh Long Quang Nam Phu Tho
S2. Public Education	Overall Rating of Primary School (5 pt scale)	d606ce	0	5	3.86	3.96	3.97	3.98	3.93	4.03	Minimum Median Maximum	3.22 3.93 4.39	Dak Nong Thai Nguyen Ca Mau
S2. Public Education	Total School Quality (9 criteria)	d606cda-cdi	0	9	4.43	4.88	5.09	4.91	4.65	5.17	Minimum Median Maximum	2.31 5.00 7.08	Cao Bang Ben Tre Ninh Binh
S3. Infrastructure	Households with Electricity (%)	d607	0%	100%	97.04%	97.76%	98.5%	98.63%	97.95%	99.31%	Minimum Median Maximum	62.18% 100% 100%	Dien Bien Gia Lai Multiple
S3. Infrastructure	Quality of Road (1=All Dirt; 4=All Asphalt)	d608	1	4	2.80	2.85	2.82	2.91	2.84	2.98	Minimum Median Maximum	1.65 2.90 3.67	Ha Giang Hoa Binh Hai Phong
S3. Infrastructure	Frequency of Garbage Pick-up (0=Never; 4=Every Day)	d609	0	4	1.92	2.42	2.62	3.00	2.70	3.29	Minimum Median Maximum	0.15 2.44 5.50	Son La Kien Giang Binh Duong
S3. Infrastructure	Share Drinking Tap Water (%)	d610=5 or 6	0%	100%	34.80%	42.07%	40.17%	41.94%	36.38%	47.49%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.19% 30.16% 99.99%	Gia Lai Dak Nong Da Nang
S3. Infrastructure	Share Drinking Unclean Water (%)	d610=1 or 2	0%	100%	6.45%	6.41%	7.91%	7.45%	4.52%	10.39%	Minimum Median Maximum	0% 0.55% 63.69%	Multiple Khanh Hoa Ha Nam
S4. Law and Order	How Safe is Locality (3=Very Safe)	d510a	1	3	1.97	1.97	2.03	2.07	2.04	2.10	Minimum Median Maximum	1.77 2.05 2.42	Binh Phuoc Lai Chau Ca Mau
S4. Law and Order	Change in Safety Over Time	d510a-d510b	Min	Max	8.09%	10.96%	14.98%	15.29%	13.09%	17.49%	Minimum Median Maximum	-4.40% 13.66% 49.40%	Kon Tum Ninh Binh Ca Mau
S4. Law and Order	Crime Rate in Locality (% Victims of Crime)	d511a-d511d	0%	100%	18.26%	17.17%	15.34%	14%	11.84%	16.16%	Minimum Median Maximum	1.63 11.93 51.64	Binh Duong Nghe An Ha Giang

Note: (\*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum. For data in the 2014 PAPI and later iterations, national weights rather than provincial weights are used in generating national level statistics.

Figure 3.6b: Change in Performance in Public Service Delivery (% - 2014 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2014 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant

### Public Health Care


This sub-dimension contributes to the understanding of how public district hospitals perform to provide the health sector with vital evidence in its search for solutions to overcrowding in public provincial and central hospitals and to improving public hospitals in general. To help meet this objective, the sub-dimension studies the overall quality of public hospitals at district level and offers a snapshot of public health insurance effectiveness, availability of free medical checks for children under six years old and free health care for the poor. By focusing on user feedback it also complements the new policy efforts by the Ministry of Health (Decision No 4858/QĐ-BYT) in setting up a set of indicators to measure the quality of hospitals from the perspective of providers.

There tends to be some year-on-year decrease in the national aggregate of total district hospital quality. In 2013, service users scored public district hospitals at an average level of 5.75 points, but in 2014 the score went down to 5.32 on a scale of 0-10 points (see Table 3.6). The difference between the highest and lowest indicator scores is remarkably large, with Vinh Long scoring 9.35 while Ca Mau scores only 2.56.

Figure 3.6c suggests that users of public district hospitals in Vinh Long, Quang Nam and Can Tho were satisfied with what they received, although they pointed out areas that need improvement. Lang Son, Ha Giang, Bac Can, Hoa Binh and Son La belied their reputations as poor provinces and were listed as top 10 performers. The issues most complain about in these provinces remain with patients sharing beds at district hospitals, lack of respect from health-care workers and long waiting periods.

**Figure 3.6c: Citizens' Assessment of Public District Hospitals**

(Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect = 100%)



At the other end of the spectrum are Ca Mau, Thai Nguyen, Ninh Binh, Long An and Gia Lai. For these provinces to catch up with the better performers, all of the ten indicators need to improve. Among the fifteen poorest performers are Hai Phong, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City, where public district hospitals may face a lack of adequate attention and investment. Can Tho and Da Nang saw large improvements compared to 2013.

On access to health insurance, 57.78% of respondents at national level had health insurance cards, a slight increase from previous years (see Table 3.6). Ha Giang headlined with 99.1% against 31.1% in Phu Yen. Those holding the cards were positive about the quality of health insurance received, with the national mean score of the quality only increasing insignificantly over time from 3.3 to 3.4 points on a 4 point scale. The quality of medical care for children under five is rated “good”, with a national mean score of 4 on a 5 point scale. Finally, state subsidy for poor households to get access to some sort of health check is confirmed by 76.46% of respondents nationwide.

## Public Primary Education

The key indicators used to construct this sub-dimension are the distance in kilometres from home to school, the length of time in minutes required for children to go to school, along with the total quality of primary schools based on nine criteria and a 1-5 point scale. These indicators can support the measurement of citizens’ satisfaction as outlined in the Ministry of Education and Training’s Decision No 3982/2013/QĐ-BGDĐT encompassing accessibility, infrastructure and facilities as well as the

educational environment, activities and results. The criteria used to measure the overall quality of public primary schools come from national minimum standards primary schools need to meet to be accredited<sup>25</sup>.

Findings from the 2014 survey show that service quality remains an area of citizen concern. Table 3.6 shows that the total quality of the service remains at an average level over time. On a 9 point scale, the national mean score has ranged between 4.4 in 2011 to 4.91 in 2014. Ninh Binh moves to the top, scoring 7.08 points on the mean value, despite its 2 point distance to the maximum level. Cao Bang lags far behind on this indicator. Most of the better performers have less favourable economic conditions, except Da Nang which has improved significantly over time regarding citizen satisfaction with primary education service. Among the five centrally governed municipalities, apart from Da Nang which as mentioned performs well, Hai Phong remains in the top 15, while Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Noi and Can Tho are in the average group.

The star graphs in Figure 3.6d underscore the challenge for all provinces to meet the minimum quality criteria as per Circular No 59/2012/TT-BGDĐT. Even Ninh Binh, which posts the closest to perfect scores in 2014, has issues to address such as teacher favouritism towards schoolchildren taking extra classes. The bottom five performers, Cao Bang, Son La, Kien Giang, Binh Thuan and Binh Duong, clearly need to beef up on every front. Poor quality teaching performance, bribery and irregular feedback from schools remain three key challenges that the education sector needs to address to satisfy users and to provide better quality primary education services.


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*Poor quality teaching performance, bribery and irregular feedback from schools remain three key challenges that the education sector needs to address to satisfy users and to provide better quality primary education services.*

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<sup>25</sup> See Circular No.59/2012/TT-BGDĐT of the Ministry of Education and Training on 28 December 2012 for detailed minimum standards for primary schools to be accredited “national standards achievers”.

**Figure 3.6d: Citizens’ Assessment of Public Primary Schools**  
 (Branch Size = % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect = 100%)



*Around 42% of respondents across the country reported access to clean water at home as the primary source of drinking water, as opposed to untreated water from rivers, lakes or rainwater.*

Most respondents with children in primary schools rated the overall quality of primary education between “average” and “good”, evident in the national mean score of 3.98 on a scale of 1 (“very poor”) to 5 (“very good”). This is similar to previous findings. Ca Mau posted a remarkably high score (4.39), while Dak Nong respondents rated education as only “average”.

The national median for the distance travelled from home to the nearest primary school is stable at one kilometre and the median journey time is 8.6 minutes, about the same as previous years. The largest mean distance is in Binh Phuoc, where

schoolchildren commute for 1.8 kilometres to primary schools. In Nam Dinh, it is only half a kilometre.

### Basic Infrastructure

This sub-dimension measures citizens’ satisfaction with basic infrastructure against what should be provided by local governments. Specifically, it looks at households’ access to electricity, the quality of roads nearest houses, frequency of garbage collections in residential areas and quality of drinking water.

Citizens across the country have good access to electricity overall, with 98.6% of respondents plugged into electricity use at home. Half of all provinces have 100% household coverage. Dien Bien has made little progress in electricity coverage over the past four years and still has the lowest percentage of respondents reporting access to electricity, with 62.18% in 2014.

Findings on the other three indicators, quality of roads, frequency of garbage pick-ups and share of drinking tap water, are similar to previous surveys, with lingering differences between urban and rural provinces. In Ha Giang dirt and gravel roads remain common, while in Hai Phong respondents exclusively use paved roads. On the frequency of garbage collections, Binh Duong provides the most frequent services with more daily collections, while Son La has the most infrequent collections.

Around 42% of respondents across the country reported access to clean water at home as the primary source of drinking water, as opposed to untreated water from rivers, lakes or rainwater (7.45%). In Gia Lai just 0.2% of respondents can access clean water, exactly the same number as in 2012 and 2013. This is in stark contrast to Da Nang where all respondents have access to clean water at home.

## Law and Order

The levels of safety experienced by citizens in everyday life is reflected by a trio of indicators in the shape of safety levels in localities, changes in safety levels and crime rates in localities (vehicle theft, robbery, break-ins and physical violence).

As Table 3.6 shows, there has been little improvement in law and order since 2011, as the national mean is 1.64 points – short of the 2.5 ideal score for this sub-dimension. At a national level, around

15.3% of respondents observed positive law and order changes in their localities, a little higher than in 2013. Ca Mau appears a relatively safe place to live, while Binh Phuoc respondents experienced one or more of the four types of crime in 2014.

Law and order at the local level as perceived by respondents has improved insignificantly, with 14% of respondents reporting they were victims of one of the four crime types in 2014. As many as 51.64% of respondents in Ha Giang were victims of crime during the 12 months before the survey, as opposed to just 1.63% in Binh Duong. Poorer provinces seem to see more cases of safety crimes, with Ha Giang, Quang Tri, Binh Thuan, Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dak Lak and Dak Nong tending to report more cases. Home break-ins top the list of common crimes across the country.

In summary, findings from this dimension indicate slight improvements in the quality of three out of four selected public services (that is public health care, basic infrastructure and residential law and order). In particular, improving access to basic infrastructure (electricity, roads, clean water and garbage collection) contributes to the higher dimensional score. On the other hand, public primary education services tend to see less user satisfaction at a national aggregate level. All provincial governments need to invest more in education services in terms of human resources and interactions between service users and public primary schools.

It is necessary for Viet Nam as a middle-income country to continue improving public services and basic infrastructure. Better public services, in particular health and education, will bring about better human resources that foster innovation and creativity for a more advanced economy. In the meantime, better infrastructure and law and order will help boost productivity and efficiency. They are important contributions to helping the country secure a sustainable pace of development.

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*All provincial governments need to invest more in education services in terms of human resources and interactions between service users and public primary schools.*

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## 2014 PAPI CONTROL PANEL

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*Although none of the provinces are in the best performing group in all six dimensions, some provinces can be seen in four or five of them.*

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### Control Panel by Dimensions

Table 3.7 presents provincial performance by dimensions, adopting the same colour codes used in the performance maps in this chapter. By showing the control panel, the table reveals in which dimensions provinces excel and in which dimensions they need to catch up.

Although none of the provinces are in the best performing group in all six dimensions, some provinces can be seen in four or five of them. Quang Binh is one of the best performers in five dimensions, and in the last dimension ('Participation at Local Levels') it is in the second best performing group. Quang Tri, Vinh Long, Nam Dinh, Long An, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai are all in the best performing group in four dimensions. At the other end of the spectrum, the northern

mountainous province of Ha Giang can be found in the poorest performing group in all six dimensions. Lai Chau, Cao Bang and Khanh Hoa are in the poorest performing group in five dimensions.


Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi differ greatly, with the former found more often in the best and second best performing group than the latter. Ho Chi Minh City performs well in 'Public Service Delivery' and pretty well in 'Transparency', 'Vertical Accountability', 'Control of Corruption' and 'Public Administrative Procedures', while trailing behind in 'Participation at Local Levels'. On the contrary, Ha Noi performs well in 'Participation at Local Levels', pretty well in 'Transparency' but falls behind in the other four dimensions, with the poorest being 'Control of Corruption'.

Table 3.7: Control Panel of 2014 PAPI Findings by Dimension Performance (\*)

Province	D1. Participation at Local Levels	D2. Transparency	D3. Vertical Accountability	D4. Control of Corruption	D5. Public Admin. Procedures	D6. Public Service Delivery
An Giang	4.757	5.584	5.732	7.017	6.889	7.165
Ba Ria -Vung Tau	5.566	6.585	5.773	5.743	6.844	7.595
Bac Giang	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Bac Kan	5.331	6.206	5.481	6.055	6.710	6.805
Bac Lieu	4.763	5.372	5.628	6.593	6.709	6.942
Bac Ninh	5.265	5.218	5.505	5.336	6.826	7.101
Ben Tre	4.551	5.786	6.116	6.455	6.767	6.894
Binh Dinh	5.773	6.295	5.929	6.573	6.702	7.347
Binh Duong	5.116	6.118	5.741	7.226	7.051	7.644
Binh Phuoc	4.945	5.712	5.276	5.894	7.139	6.009
Binh Thuan	4.673	5.735	5.288	6.226	7.105	7.495
Ca Mau	5.207	5.795	5.613	7.286	6.815	6.459
Can Tho	4.831	5.060	5.103	5.928	6.595	6.708
Cao Bang	4.837	5.433	5.217	5.403	6.544	6.400
Da Nang	4.832	6.160	6.042	5.633	7.614	7.731
Dak Lak	4.370	6.394	5.261	6.160	6.848	6.643
Dak Nong	5.636	6.022	5.642	5.990	7.069	6.566
Dien Bien	4.572	5.830	5.313	4.847	6.755	6.657
Dong Nai	4.749	5.420	5.526	5.442	7.272	6.814
Dong Thap	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Gia Lai	5.514	5.345	5.741	5.896	7.307	6.445
Ha Giang	4.344	4.936	4.671	5.320	6.419	6.335
Ha Nam	5.389	5.740	6.363	6.181	6.709	6.922
Ha Noi	5.307	6.006	5.636	5.229	6.802	6.821
Ha Tinh	5.669	5.813	5.723	6.472	7.167	6.725
Hai Duong	5.251	5.758	6.066	5.328	6.787	7.021
Hai Phong	4.754	6.042	4.506	4.917	7.083	7.670
Hau Giang	4.380	6.064	5.994	6.617	6.780	6.750
Hoa Binh	5.478	6.501	5.940	6.273	7.006	7.034
Hung Yen	4.903	5.719	5.661	5.987	6.518	7.075
Khanh Hoa	4.640	5.182	5.432	5.334	6.708	6.809
Kien Giang	4.381	5.069	5.701	5.992	6.910	7.262
Kon Tum	4.751	5.409	5.518	5.129	7.022	6.701
Lai Chau	4.576	4.803	5.177	5.613	6.553	6.682
Lam Dong	5.060	5.746	5.612	6.244	6.737	7.130
Lang Son	4.991	6.622	5.856	6.267	7.066	7.106
Lao Cai	5.412	6.625	5.533	5.378	6.882	6.787
Long An	4.936	6.728	6.180	6.670	7.210	7.127
Nam Dinh	5.064	6.822	6.295	6.197	7.238	7.267
Nghe An	4.990	6.118	6.217	5.536	7.034	6.702
Ninh Binh	4.967	6.133	5.468	6.315	7.131	6.906
Ninh Thuan	3.963	5.082	5.038	6.215	6.710	7.354
Phu Tho	5.038	5.785	6.151	6.378	6.981	6.483
Phu Yen	4.447	5.178	5.718	5.281	6.428	7.070
Quang Binh	5.267	6.192	6.552	6.642	7.332	7.258
Quang Nam	4.983	5.598	5.768	6.540	6.556	6.953
Quang Ngai	5.064	6.654	6.185	6.805	6.756	7.187
Quang Ninh	5.349	5.474	5.438	5.623	6.403	6.561
Quang Tri	5.894	6.676	6.668	6.509	6.982	7.116
Soc Trang	4.648	5.448	5.750	6.679	6.425	6.830
Son La	4.789	5.665	5.689	6.026	6.636	6.237
Tay Ninh	4.427	5.081	5.780	6.434	7.018	6.349
Thai Binh	5.682	6.800	5.612	6.300	6.812	6.986
Thai Nguyen	5.522	5.819	5.733	5.408	7.167	6.716
Thanh Hoa	5.284	5.967	5.794	6.137	6.826	6.871
Thua Thien-Hue	5.145	6.019	5.775	6.115	6.674	7.290
Tien Giang	4.549	5.388	5.534	6.474	6.940	6.735
TP. Ho Chi Minh	4.694	5.845	5.782	6.398	6.847	7.536
Tra Vinh	4.369	5.620	5.806	6.449	6.878	6.701
Tuyen Quang	5.341	6.429	5.965	6.537	6.807	6.777
Vinh Long	4.775	6.299	6.540	7.273	6.986	7.860
Vinh Phuc	5.316	6.009	6.373	5.752	7.241	6.857
Yen Bai	5.194	6.317	5.493	5.395	7.001	6.673

(\*) Dimensions 1 to 6 are scaled with scores from "1" as minimum and "10" as maximum

## Colour code:


	Best Performers	Above 75th percentile		Low Average	Between 25th and 50th percentile
	High Average	Between 50th and 75th percentile		Poor Performers	Below 25th percentile

However, presenting just the average dimension scores as in Table 3.7 overstates the level of precision of the PAPI exercise. What can be said with a high degree of certainty though, is that the average scores represent the most likely score within a range of scores that are possible in a repeated random sampling. Figure 3.7a provides a different perspective that displays

the range of possible dimension scores for three provinces: Quang Tri, which has the highest sum of the six dimensions, Ha Giang, the province with the lowest sum score, and Binh Thuan, the province with the median sum score. Figure 3.7a presents the possible scores of the three provinces with the 90% confidence intervals, rather than presenting the average dimension scores.

**Figure 3.7a: Un-weighted 2014 PAPI Max, Median and Mean Scores**

(Each branch size = level of dimensional performance on the scale from 1-10 per dimension. Rankings ascend horizontally down the chart)




Displaying PAPI scores in this way is particularly relevant for policymakers because it shows where citizens within and across provinces have consensus on high or low performing dimensions. Figure 3.7a shows that scores for the dimension ‘Public Administrative Procedures’ tend to converge in all three provinces and across the country at a level ranging from 6-7.5 points. On this dimension, the confidence intervals of each province tend to overlap each other, indicating that their scores are not statistically distinguishable and could be reversed in repeated samples. Meanwhile, scores with the 90% confidence intervals of the three maximum, median and minimum

provinces differ significantly in ‘Transparency’ and ‘Vertical Accountability’, both within and between the provinces. Readers interested in provincial confidence intervals around provincial scores can download the csv file from the PAPI website at [www.papi.vn](http://www.papi.vn).

### Stability Over Time

Figure 3.7b provides a scatter plot of the 2013 and 2014 PAPI indices. The indices have a correlation coefficient of 0.46, which is significant at the 99% level. This indicates that PAPI is highly stable over time, although not fixed, allowing provinces to improve their performances.

**Figure 3.7b: Correlation Between 2013 and 2014 PAPI Indices**



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# APPENDICES

## Appendix A. Key Demographic Specifications of PAPI 2014 Sample

PAPI has been designed, built and implemented following a sound and robust methodology based on the initial experiment in 2009, the expanded survey in 2010 and the first nationwide survey in 2011<sup>26</sup>. The reliability of the PAPI survey can be checked against the variables made available since the release of the 2009 National Population Census. Table A compares the distribution

of key demographic variables between the two datasets and confirms the closeness of the PAPI sample to the actual demographic characteristics of the Vietnamese population. In addition, the impact of weights on the composition of the sample by ethnicity is shown in Figure A1, while Figure A2 presents the comparison of the age distribution.

**Table A: Comparison of Key Demographic Variables Over Time and with 2009 Census (%)**


	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	PAPI 2014	Census 2009
<b>Gender</b>					
<b>Male</b>	47.04	47.33	47.32	47.08	49.41
<b>Female</b>	52.96	52.67	52.68	52.92	50.59
<b>Ethnicity</b>					
<b>Kinh</b>	84.5	84.35	84.57	83.93	85.73
<b>Others</b>	15.5	15.64	15.43	15.99	14.27

The representativeness of the PAPI 2014 sample with the national population is ensured by the comparison of raw data and post stratification weights (PSW) applied for the occupation and education levels of respondents. This is shown in Figures A3


and A4 for occupation and education levels, respectively. In short, PAPI 2014 is adequately representative of the underlying population to allow for meaningful comparisons across provinces and groups.

<sup>26</sup> Interested readers can reference Chapter 3 of the PAPI 2010 Report (VFF, CECODES & UNDP, 2011, pp. 93-104) and Appendix A of the PAPI 2011 Report (CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 2012, pp. 117-118) for more details.


**Figure A1: PAPI 2014 Kinh Ethnicity Composition vs. National Census 2009**




**Figure A2: Age Distribution of PAPI 2014 Sample vs. National Census 2009**  
(excluding respondents aged 70 or above in PAPI sample)



**Figure A3: Occupation of PAPI 2014 Respondents (%)**



**Figure A4: Education Levels of PAPI 2014 Respondents (%)**



**Table B: Gender Distribution of PAPI 2014 Respondents by Province**

Province	Male		Female		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.
An Giang	173	44.70	214	55.30	387
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	119	46.12	139	53.88	258
Bac Kan	98	47.57	108	52.43	206
Bac Lieu	91	46.91	103	53.09	194
Bac Ninh	85	44.50	106	55.50	191
Ben Tre	98	48.51	104	51.49	202
Binh Dinh	91	46.67	104	53.33	195
Binh Duong	94	48.21	101	51.79	195
Binh Phuoc	93	47.94	101	52.06	194
Binh Thuan	91	45.27	110	54.73	201
Ca Mau	98	48.76	103	51.24	201
Can Tho	91	46.91	103	53.09	194
Cao Bang	87	45.31	105	54.69	192
Da Nang	90	45.69	107	54.31	197
Dak Lak	89	46.11	104	53.89	193
Dak Nong	82	43.39	107	56.61	189
Dien Bien	91	47.89	99	52.11	190
Dong Nai	184	47.30	205	52.70	389
Gia Lai	97	50.26	96	49.74	193
Ha Giang	106	53.54	92	46.46	198
Ha Nam	87	43.94	111	56.06	198
Ha Noi	277	48.01	300	51.99	577
Ha Tinh	94	47.72	103	52.28	197
Hai Duong	93	44.71	115	55.29	208
Hai Phong	92	47.18	103	52.82	195
Hau Giang	115	56.10	90	43.90	205
Hoa Binh	98	47.12	110	52.88	208
Hung Yen	95	48.97	99	51.03	194
Khanh Hoa	76	41.99	105	58.01	181
Kien Giang	102	53.68	88	46.32	190
Kon Tum	87	44.62	108	55.38	195

Province	Male		Female		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Lai Chau	98	49.49	100	50.51	198
Lam Dong	92	47.67	101	52.33	193
Lang Son	87	44.62	108	55.38	195
Lao Cai	94	48.96	98	51.04	192
Long An	93	47.94	101	52.06	194
Nam Dinh	95	45.45	114	54.55	209
Nghe An	179	44.97	219	55.03	398
Ninh Binh	83	43.23	109	56.77	192
Ninh Thuan	86	44.79	106	55.21	192
Phu Tho	97	46.86	110	53.14	207
Phu Yen	87	44.39	109	55.61	196
Quang Binh	84	43.08	111	56.92	195
Quang Nam	94	48.70	99	51.30	193
Quang Ngai	103	50.99	99	49.01	202
Quang Ninh	102	53.40	89	46.60	191
Quang Tri	98	48.28	105	51.72	203
Soc Trang	92	46.70	105	53.30	197
Son La	93	48.19	100	51.81	193
Tp. HCM	251	44.50	313	55.50	564
Tay Ninh	99	49.25	102	50.75	201
Thai Binh	94	45.19	114	54.81	208
Thai Nguyen	94	49.21	97	50.79	191
Thanh Hoa	176	45.71	209	54.29	385
Thua Thien-Hue	95	50.00	95	50.00	190
Tien Giang	90	46.39	104	53.61	194
Tra Vinh	95	48.47	101	51.53	196
Tuyen Quang	99	51.03	95	48.97	194
Vinh Long	89	45.41	107	54.59	196
Vinh Phuc	91	47.40	101	52.60	192
Yen Bai	83	42.78	111	57.22	194
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,377</b>	<b>47.06</b>	<b>7,175</b>	<b>52.94</b>	<b>13,552</b>

## Appendix B: A Sample of Provincial Responses to PAPI Findings

Provinces	Type of Responses (*)	Responsible Party
<b>An Giang</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 28/10/2013 Action Plan No. 1116/UBND-TH dated 10/10/2014	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee
<b>Bac Giang</b>	2013 PAPI diagnostic workshop for provincial, district and commune leaders Action Plan No. 1492 KH-UBND dated 6 June 2014 on improving performance for higher provincial PAPI scores Provincial conventions of dissemination of PAPI towards commune leaders	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee Bac Giang Department of Home Affairs
<b>Binh Dinh</b>	Directive No. 13/CT-UBND dated 8/8/2013 Provincial diagnostic workshops	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee
<b>Binh Thuan</b>	Directive No. 28/CT-UBND dated 13/9/2013	Provincial People's Committee
<b>Ca Mau</b>	Directive No. 06/CT-UBND dated 17/9/2013 Action Plan on Improving PAPI Scores in 2014	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee
<b>Cao Bang</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 18/09/2012 Provincial diagnostics workshop and analysis	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
<b>Da Nang</b>	In-depth analysis of PAPI 2012 Report to People's Committee In-depth analysis of PAPI 2013 Report to People's Committee Training workshop on how to improve PAPI	Institute for Socio-Economic Development Institute for Socio-Economic Development Dept. of Home Affairs
<b>Dak Lak</b>	Official Letter No. 2211/UBND-TH dated 03/5/2012	Provincial People's Committee
<b>Dak Nong</b>	Decision No. 276/QĐ-UBND/2013 dated 22/02/2013 with concrete action plan	Provincial People's Committee
<b>Dien Bien</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
<b>Dong Thap</b>	Directive No. 13/CT-UBND dated 5/8/2013 Tam Nông District Plan No 132/KH-UBND for improvement of PAR performance and PAPI scores 2013 PAPI diagnostic workshop for provincial, district and commune leaders Education and health sector diagnostic workshops, 26 November 2014	Provincial People's Committee Tam Nong District People's Committee Provincial People's Committee Department of Education and Department of Health
<b>Ha Giang</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 20/11/2013 Resolution No. 118-NQ-HĐND dated 11 December 2013 stressing the importance to increase PAPI scores Action Plan No. 119/CTr-UBND on improving governance and public administration performance towards 2015 dated 21 July 2014	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy) Provincial People's Council Provincial People's Committee
<b>Ha Nam</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
<b>Ha Tinh</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 25/06/2011 Decision No. 587/QĐ-UBND dated 29/02/2012 on PAR reform of the province, stressing the need to maintain and strengthen PAPI scores	Provincial Viet Nam Fatherland Front People's Committee

Provinces	Type of Responses (*)	Responsible Party
<b>Kon Tum</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop in 2010 Replicated PAPI survey for nine districts in 2011 Decision No. 703/QĐ-UBND dated 3/8/2012	Provincial People's Committee
<b>Lao Cai</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 16/08/2013	Provincial People's Committee
<b>Ninh Binh</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
<b>Phu Yen</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012 2012 PAPI provincial diagnostics workshop on 06/12/2013 Action Plan No. 03/CTr-UBND dated 11 April 2014 2013 PAPI diagnostic workshop for provincial, district and commune leaders, July 2014	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy) Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee
<b>Quang Nam</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
<b>Quang Ngai</b>	Directive No. 19/CT-UBND dated 29/11/2012 Resolution No. 08/2013/NQ-HDND dated 10/07/2013 2013 PAPI diagnostic workshop for provincial and district leaders, 12 November 2014	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Council Provincial People's Committee
<b>Quang Ninh</b>	2013 PAPI diagnostic workshop for provincial and district leaders, 27 October 2014 Decision No. 6568/KH-UBND on improving provincial governance and public administration performance index (PAPI) dated 18 Nov 2014	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy) Provincial People's Committee
<b>Soc Trang</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
<b>Thai Nguyen</b>	Resolution No. 15/2012/NQ-HDND dated 15/12/2012 Provincial diagnostics workshop on 17/12/2013 Decision No 3138/QĐ-UBND approving the Action Plan for Higher PAPI Scores for the Period from 2015-2020 dated 31 December 2014	Provincial People's Council Provincial People's Committee/ Dept. Home Affairs Provincial People's Committee
<b>Tra Vinh</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
<b>Vinh Long</b>	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, December 2014	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)

(\*) See <http://papi.vn/en/provincial-policy-responses.html> for detailed provincial policy responses

## Implementing Partners



### Centre for Community Support & Development Studies (CECODES)

Established by the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) from 2007, CECODES is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation specialised in development research and community support. The overall function of CECODES is to carry out evidence-based research to assess policy impact and to implement solutions to strengthening capacity of communities. CECODES works towards contributing to the improvement of governance performance, focusing on facilitating the interactions between the State, the Market, and the Civil Society.



Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front

### Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)

Established on 28 December 2012 under Decision No. 1725/QĐ-MTTW-BTT by the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF), the Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front is an autonomous agency operating by state laws and regulations. VFF-CRT has the four mandates, including: (i) to provide training and retraining of VFF personnel from all levels; (ii) to conduct research on theory and practice of great solidarity, institutional settings and operation of the VFF and other relevant areas and thematic issues; (iii) to set up and operationalise VFF Museum; (iv) to coordinate and partner with other research and training institutions home and abroad in research and personnel training.



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UNDP is the United Nations' global development organization, a network advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As countries develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and its wide range of partners.

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[www.undp.org.vn](http://www.undp.org.vn)



Centre for Community Support  
and Development Studies  
No. 16, 34/23 Alley, Nguyen Hong St.  
Dong Da Dist., Hanoi - Vietnam  
Tel: (84 4) 3573 8496  
Fax: (84 4) 3573 8497  
[www.cecodes.org](http://www.cecodes.org)

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